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Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics
Linet
Richard Briffault*
I.

The Issue Advocacy Problem

In the closing weeks of the 1996 election, Montana's airwaves were
flooded with the following television advertisement:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but he took a
swing at his wife. Yellowtail's explanation? He 'only slapped her,'
but her nose was broken. He talks law and order, but is himsclf a
convicted criminal. And though he talks about protecting children,
Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments, then voted
against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail and tell him
we don't approve of his wrongful behavior. Call (406) 443-3620.I
The anti-Yellowtail ad, financed by an organization cryptically named
Citizens for Reform,2 was a classic instance of contemporary "issue
advocacy." It was an issue ad not because it discussed any issues, but
because it avoided "express advocacy" of either Democrat Yellowtail's
defeat or the election of Rick Hill, Yellowtail's Republican opponent, in
the race for Montana's seat in the House of Representatives. The ad
featured harsh criticism of Yellowtail by name, was broadcast on the eve

t This paper was first prepared in connection with IF BUCKLEY FELL (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.,
Century Foundation 1999), a publication sponsored jointly by the Century Foundation and the Brennan
Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.
* Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School; B.A.
1974, Columbia University; J.D. 1977, Harvard Law School.
1. The quotation in text is actually a composite from several sources. The principal source is
Public Citizen, Phony 'Issue Ads': The Newest Loophole (visited May 11, 1999) <http:/
/www.citizen.org/congress/reformlissueads.htm>.
The Public Citizen statement quotes the ad as
stating "her nose was not broken" (emphasis added). In other sources, the ad states "her nose was
broken" (emphasis added). See, e.g., Joe Lieberman, Tax-Exempt GroupsAbused Spirit,LetterofLaw
in '96 Elections (last modified Feb. 9, 1998) < http://www.senate.gov/ - liebermanlsO20998a.html >;
Will Closing a Campaign Finance Loophole Strangle Nonprofit Issue Advocacy?, RESPONSIVE
PHILANTHROPY (Nat'l Comm. for Responsive Philanthropy Quarterly, visited May 11, 1999),
<http://www.ncrp.org/articles/rp/campfinref.htm>. The latter reading makes more sense and I have
amended the Public Citizen quotation accordingly.
2. See DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADvOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 22
(1997).
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of the election, and was paid for by an organization that spent $2 million
supporting Republican candidates in elections across the country.' The ad
contained an electioneering message but, because it carefully refrained
from any call to vote against Yellowtail or for Hill, the ad fell short of
express advocacy and was, instead, an issue ad. As a result, it was exempt
from regulation under the Federal Election Campaign Act' (FECA)-even
the provisions requiring the sponsor to disclose who paid for the ad.
The world of campaign finance regulation has conventionally been
divided into two parts-contributions and expenditures. But in today's
world the contribution/expenditure distinction increasingly pales in
significance when compared to the difference between campaign
contributions and expenditures on the one hand and issue advocacy on the
other. Contributions and expenditures are both subject to reporting and
disclosure requirements,5 and contributions and expenditures by business
corporations and labor unions may be prohibited.6 By contrast, reporting
and disclosure laws do not apply to issue advocacy campaigns, and there
is no restriction on corporate or union issue advocacy. 7 Moreover,
although contributions to candidates, political parties, and organizations
that make contributions to candidates may be subject to dollar limitations,
contributions for issue advocacy may not be subject to such limits.' A
federal district court even held recently that the statutory ban on campaign
contributions by foreign nationals does not apply to contributions for issue
ad campaigns. 9
Issue advocacy, like soft money, is campaign activity that is beyond
the scope of federal regulation. Soft money and issue advocacy are often
intertwined, and soft money pays for much of the issue advocacy
undertaken by political parties."0 But whereas the soft money exemption

3. See id. at 22 (noting that Citizens for Reform ran advertisements opposing Democratic
candidates like Bill Yellowtail in 15 congressional districts).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
5. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994) (detailing reporting and disclosure requirements); 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(9)(A) (1994) (defining "expenditure"); 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (1994) (explaining the term
"contribution").
6. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994) (prohibiting national banks, corporations, and labor unions from
making contributions in connection with elections).
7. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-44, 78-80 (1976) (construing the requirements and
restrictions in the FECA to apply to express advocacy only).
8. See id. at 42-44 (exempting those expenditures made for issue discussion or advocacy of a
political result from FECA restrictions).
9. See David Johnston, Ruling May Hurt Campaign FinanceCases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998,
at A27 (citing Judge Paul L. Friedman's pretrial ruling in the federal prosecution of "important
Democratic fund-raiser" Yah Lin Trie that "the statute does not on its face ... proscribe soft money
by foreign nationals").
10. See ELIzABETH DREW, WHATEVER ITTAKES: THE REAL STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER
IN AMERICA 116-18, 186 (rev. ed. 1998) (describing how the National Republican Congressional
Committee used soft money to fund various issue advocacy ads).
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is largely the product of legislative and administrative action," the
exclusion of issue advocacy from regulation is a matter of constitutional
interpretation. 12
The express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction grows out of the need
to draw a line between election campaign spending and general political
spending. Such a line is needed so long as we operate under a
constitutional regime which simultaneously (i) protects political speech
from government regulation; (ii) treats political spending as a form of
political speech; but (iii) permits regulation of political spending that is
election related.
These three characteristics define the present campaign finance regime
under Buckley v. Valeo. 13 But they would also frame campaign finance
regulation under either of the principal alternatives to Buckley. If the
Constitution were reinterpreted-or amended-to permit greater regulation
of election-related speech, to justify regulation in terms of the egalitarian
values dismissed in Buckley, and to permit limitations on expenditures by
candidates and by independent committees, there would still be a need to
determine what is an election-related expenditure and what is not. By the
same token, if the Constitution were reinterpreted to elevate contributions
to the status of expenditures, to invalidate all dollar limitations on
campaign finance practices, and to rely exclusively on disclosure laws to
guard against corruption or undue influence, 4 it would still be necessary
to determine what constitutes the election-related activity that could be
subject to disclosure requirements.
Drawing a line between elections and politics is, in some sense,
logically and practically impossible. Elections are-or ought to be-about
political issues and ideas; politics, in turn, is often focused on elections.
Election-related speech will typically refer to political issues, and political
speech will frequently refer to elected officials or candidates for office.
The Buckley Court put it well:
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in

11.

See generally Note, Soft Money: The CurrentRules and the Casefor Reform, 111 HARV. L.

REv. 1323, 1324-28 (1998). It has, however, been argued that soft money contributions to a political
party for an issue advocacy campaign enjoy the same constitutional protection as issue advocacy itself.
See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The ConstitutionalProhibitionon a Soft Money
Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 196-99 (1998).
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 16-19, 23, 29.

14. Justice Thomas has suggested eliminating the distinction in the First Amendment status of
expenditures and contributions. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Conm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 635-44 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in thejudgment and dissenting in part)

(calling for strict scrutiny review of both restrictions and contributions); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
PoliticalMoney and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 663, 688-89 (1997) (arguing for a
campaign finance regulatory regime limited to disclosure).
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practical application.
Candidates, especially incumbents, are
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and
governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis
of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves
generate issues of public interest. 15
Yet, even the weakest form of campaign finance regulation necessarily
requires that a distinction be made between election-related spending and
other political spending.
To say that we need to draw a line between elections and politics does
not, of course, tell us where that line should be. In Buckley, the Supreme
Court drew a distinction between express advocacy and other political
activity now known as issue advocacy. Under Buckley, only "expenditures
for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate" may be subject to regulation. 6 By way of
example, a footnote in Buckley listed "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast
your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [and]
'reject"' as a non-exhaustive list of examples of "express words of
advocacy."17

Buckley's express advocacy test appears to reflect three concerns.
First, despite, or perhaps, because of the close connection between
elections and politics, the Supreme Court sought a standard that clearly
distinguishes election-related spending from other political spending. To
avoid vagueness and the chilling effect on political speech that can result
from vague regulation, Buckley requires the definition of election-related
speech to be sharply drawn.
Second, the Court seemed worried about unwelcome administrative or
judicial probing of the intentions of speakers. Extensive intrusion into the
internal communications of an organization or the inner workings of a
speaker's mind to determine whether the speaker intended to influence an
election would raise serious First Amendment problems. Buckley instead
grounded its standard on the content of the communication.'8 Whether
a message is campaign related must be assessed according to its words.
Third, the Court's definition of election-related speech appears
intended to maximize the protection of general political speech and to
minimize the degree to which election regulation may trench on political
speech. Election-related speech must be defined narrowly-even though
this will enable some election-related speech to evade regulation-in order
to assure that general political speech is not restricted.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 44, 79-80.
Id. at 44 n.52.
Id. at 43-44.
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The Supreme Court has given only minimal attention to the definition
of election-related spending since Buckley. t9 The lower federal courts
have, for the most part, assumed that the First Amendment prohibits any
attempt to regulate political spending that refrains from using Buckley's
"magic words" of express advocacy."
This has enabled sophisticated
political players to effectively evade many campaign finance regulations,
including the prohibitions on contributions and expenditures from corporate
and union treasury funds, the dollar limits on individual contributions, and
reporting and disclosure requirements.
This Article offers an alternative definition of election-related activity
that addresses both the practical realities of contemporary political
campaigns and the free speech concerns that worried the Court in Buckley.
In Part II, I recount how the express advocacy doctrine evolved and
consider its impact on campaign finance regulation. In Part III, I examine
the constitutional values that have justified the regulation of elections and
the implications from the law of elections for the regulation of electionrelated speech. Finally, in Part IV, I present and defend a definition of
election-related speech that respects both the First Amendment-particularly
the three concerns that seemed to move the Supreme Court in Buckley-and
the values the Court has recognized that justify campaign finance
regulation.
II. The Current Doctrine and Its Consequences
The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of express advocacy
only once since Buckley. In FederalElection Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc.,2 decided ten years after Buckley, the Court
examined the "special edition" of an anti-abortion group's newsletter,
which listed state and federal candidates contesting an upcoming primary,
identified the candidates' positions on three litmus test issues, provided
photographs of those with one hundred percent favorable voting records but
not of other candidates, and exhorted readers to vote for anti-abortion
candidates.'
The Court concluded that the Special Edition constituted
express advocacy.'
The newsletter never explicitly called for votes for
a particular candidate, but it could not "be regarded as a mere discussion
of public issues that by their nature raise the names of certain politicians.
Rather, it provides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named)

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
See infra text accompanying notes 29-61.
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 249.
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candidates."24 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., thus, modestly
broadened Buckley's definition of what constitutes express advocacy,' but
the case is consistent with Buckley in relying exclusively on a close
examination of the content of the message and, especially, on the
presence of exhortations to vote for clearly identified candidates.'
Most of the lower federal courts that have considered the question
have adopted very restrictive definitions of express advocacy.'
This
tendency is nicely illustrated by the decisions in Federal Election
Commission v. ChristianAction Network.2 9 That case considered a 1992
television advertisement that (as described by the district court) referred to
Bill Clinton's support for "'radical' homosexual causes, " ' ° presented "a
series of pictures depicting advocates of homosexual rights, apparently gay
men and lesbians, demonstrating at a political march,"3" and combined
"the visual degrading of candidate Clinton's picture into a black and white
negative,"32 "ominous music, " " and "unfavorable coloring"' in a
manner that "raised strong emotions [among] viewers." 35 Both the
district court and the court of appeals concluded that the message did not
constitute express advocacy of Clinton's defeat.3 6
Although the
advertising named Clinton and used his picture, was broadcast in the weeks
immediately preceding the November 1992 general election, and was
"openly hostile" to the gay rights positions it attributed to Clinton, the ad
37
was "devoid of any language that directly exhorted the public to vote."
Indeed, the court of appeals determined that the message fell so far short
of express advocacy that it slapped the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
with attorneys' fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act for
bringing the case.38
Only the Ninth Circuit has sought to consider the impact of such a
narrow definition of express advocacy on the effectiveness of the FECA.

24. Id. at 248-50.
25. See id. at 249 (describing the assertions in the special edition as "marginally less direct than
'Vote for Smith,'" an example of express advocacy provided in Buckley).
26. See id. (noting Buckley's dependence on "the use of language such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' [and]
'support,'" and examining the special edition for similar content).
27. See id. ("The publication not only urges voters to vote for 'pro-life' candidates, but also
identifies and provides photographs of specific candidates fitting that description.").
28. See infra note 50.
29. 894 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff'dmem. 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
30. Id. at 948.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 956.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 954.
36. Id. at 953.
37. Id.
38. Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir.

1997).
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In Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch,3 9 the court found that a
newspaper advertisement published on the eve of the 1980 presidential
election that combined heated criticism of President Carter's record with
the caption and exhortation "Don't Let Him Do It" constituted express
advocacy. 40 Although the ad made no reference to voting against Carter,
the court found that "'Don't let him' is a command. The words 'expressly
advocate' action of some kind." 41 Voting against Carter in the upcoming
election "was the only action open to those who would not 'let him do
it."'42 Furgatch emphasized the need to look not just at the "magic
words" 43 cited in Buckley, but at the communication "as a whole, ...
with limited reference to external events"' such as the timing of the ad
in determining whether the message constituted an exhortation to vote for
or against a candidate.45
Furgatch constitutes only a modest expansion of Buckley's definition
of express advocacy. The court stressed that a message could constitute
express advocacy only so long as it is "susceptible of no other reasonable
The message must be
interpretation but as an exhortation to vote."'
"unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible
If "reasonable minds could differ as to whether it
meaning."'
encourages a vote for or against a candidate or encourages the reader to
take some other kind of action," it is not express advocacy.'
Other federal courts that have considered the issue have rejected
Furgatch's slight broadening of the definition of express advocacy and,
especially, Furgatch'scall to consider whether a message as a whole, with
some reference to its timing, constitutes an exhortation to vote for or
against a candidate.49 They have instead rigidly insisted on the presence

39. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. Id.at 864.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 865.
43. Id. at 863.
44. Id. at 864.
45. Id. at 863, 863-65 ("We conclude that context is relevant to a determination of express
advocacy.")
46. Id.at 864.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. A partial exception to the general rule is the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in FederalElection
Commission v. ColoradoRepublican FederalCampaign Committee, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). The Tenth Circuit found that a Republican Party ad that criticized the
record of the Democratic candidate for a U.S. Senate seat but rcfrained from using the "magic words"
was not express advocacy under Buckley. But the court also concluded that the ad contained an
'electioneering message" within the meaning of an FEC advisory opinion concerning the definition of
party-coordinated spending, and held that the ad was, thus, subject to FECA's dollar limits on
coordinated spending. See id. at 1023. The Tenth Circuit opinion was reversed on other grounds by
a fragmented Supreme Court. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FederalElection
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of words that explicitly call for the election or defeat of a candidate." In
the view of these courts, any standard that turns on administrative or
judicial interpretation of a message-even a standard of no "reasonable
minds can differ"-is too vague and poses too great a danger of chilling
protected political speech.51 For example, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals and a federal district court in New York declared unconstitutional
an FEC regulation codifying Furgatch's definition of express advocacy.5
The Fourth Circuit, in ChristianAction Network, sharply chastised the FEC
for attempting to find express advocacy in "'the combined message of
words and dramatic moving images, sounds and other non-verbal cues such
as film editing, photographic techniques, and music, involving highly

Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). The Supreme Court plurality opinion held that the Colorado
Republican Party expenditures for the ad constituted independent spending, not coordinated spending,
and were therefore not subject to FECA's limits on coordinated spending. None of the four opinions
in Colorado Republican addressed whether the FEC's "electioneering message" standard satisfied the
constitutional requirements for the definition of election-related speech. See infra note 193 and text
accompanying notes 191-193.
50. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 105657 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the FEC's argument that "whether a given communication constitutes
'express advocacy' depends upon all of the circumstances, internal and external to the communication,
that could reasonably be considered to bear upon the recipient's interpretation of the message" rather
than on explicit words or language advocating election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate);
Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n 928 F.2d 468, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1991) (invalidating an FEC
regulation that would treat as express advocacy partisan advocacy in a voter guide that avoids explicitly
calling for election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate); Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D. Me. 1996) (concluding that "part of the FEC's
definition of 'express advocacy' is beyond the FEC's power as limited by [prior] cases"), af'd, 98 F.3d
1 (1stCir. 1996); see also Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede, No. 98-4192-RDR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2285, at *8 (D. Kan. Feb. 23, 1999) (holding that an ad aired during a primary campaign that
"contrasts the positions of two candidates on the issue of abortion and asserts that one candidate is
honestly stating his position on the issue while the other is not," but avoids the express advocacy of
the election or defeat of a candidate, is issue advocacy and may not be subject to a disclosure
requirement); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 204, 214 (D. Vt. 1998)
(construing, in order to save from invalidation, a Vermont statute applying reporting and disclosure
requirements to a communication "which expressly or implicitly advocates the success or defeat of a
candidate" to encompass only those communications that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate).
51. See Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d at 1055-56, 1061 (surmising that too flexible a
standard for interpretation would result in the FEC always concluding that the challenged speech is
advocacy); see also KansansforLife, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2285, at *9 (holding that the Kansas
Governmental Ethics Commission advisory opinion requiring disclosure of sourees of funds for a
political message "which, when viewed as a whole, leads an ordinary person to believe that he or she
is being urged to vote for or against a particular political candidate for office" sets an
'unconstitutionally vague standard").
52. See Maine Right to Life Comm., 98 F.3d at 1; Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 6 F. Supp. 248, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b)
(1996), based on Fugatch, violated the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Buckley); see also Kansansfor Life, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2285, at *10 (enjoining the Kansas
Governmental Ethics Commission from enforcing a definition of express advocacy that is broader than
an explicit call for a vote for or against a particular candidate).
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charged rhetoric and provocative images . .. taken as a whole'" rather
than in explicit words of advocacy. 3
These courts have been both candid and strikingly nonchalant in their
recognition that the "magic words" approach will exclude much electionrelated spending from regulation. Even as it punished the FEC with fees
and costs for its effort to look to the meaning of the broadcast rather than
for explicit words of advocacy, the Fourth Circuit in Christian Action
Network acknowledged, quoting from the FEC's brief, that
"'[m]etaphorical and figurative speech can be more pointed and
compelling, and can thus more successfully express advocacy, than a plain,
literal recommendation to "vote" for a particular person.'"' The federal
district court in Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election
Commission55 agreed that "U]anguage ... is an elusive thing"56 and that
communication depends "heavily on context";' yet in the same breath it
held that the FEC's effort to define express advocacy with some reference
to context was unconstitutional.5" Judge Homby further conceded that
"the result is not very satisfying from a realistic communications point of
view and does not give much recognition to the policy of the election
statute to keep corporate money from influencing elections, " " but
concluded that such an unrealistic express advocacy standard was
constitutionally required.'
For both pragmatic and principled reasons, the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction articulated in Buckley and elaborated by the lower
courts must be reconsidered, and a new standard for distinguishing
election-related spending from other political spending must be developed.
Pragmatically, the current test is an open invitation for evasion. It is
child's play for political advertisers and campaign professionals to develop
ads that effectively advocate or oppose the cause of a candidate but stop
short of the formal express advocacy that the courts permit to be regulated.
The most common tactic for political advertisers is to include some
language calling for the reader, viewer, or listener to respond to the
message by doing something other than voting. In Christian Action
Network, for example, the ad called on viewers to telephone the sponsor
"[flor more information on traditional family values." 6 Other ads urged
voters to telephone the candidate targeted by the sponsor and ask him why

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

ChristianAction Network, 110 F.3d at 1064 (quoting from the FEC's brief).
Id.
914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996).
.Maine Right to Life Comm., 914 F. Supp. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Nctwork, 110 F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997).
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he opposes tax cuts or term limits. 62 A survey by the Annenberg Public
Policy Center of 107 issue advocacy advertisements that aired on television
or radio during the 1996 election cycle found that 70.1 % urged audience

members to either contact a public official or the organization sponsoring
the ad to express their views concerning a particular policy position.'3 A
similar study by the Annenberg Center of 423 issue ads aired in 1997-98
found that 77.5 %urged audience members to "call" or to "tell" an elected

official something or call the sponsoring organization.' a

By combining

sharp criticism of a candidate with an exhortation to call the sponsor or the
candidate criticized, these ads can inoculate themselves from the charge
that they constitute express advocacy.
The combination of a crabbed legal definition of express advocacy and
the ingenuity of politicians and interest groups acutely sensitive to the
opportunities for circumventing campaign finance regulation has led to an
explosion of issue advocacy. In the 1996 elections, between $135 million
and $150 million was spent on issue advocacy.'5 According to news
accounts, issue ads dominated the airwaves in the two special congressional
elections held in late 1997 and early 1998.
The Annenberg Center
estimates that between $275 million and $340 million was spent on issue
advocacy in connection with the 1998 congressional elections67 -roughly
a doubling from 1996 and a remarkable increase in spending from a

presidential to a non-presidential election year.
Issue ads are increasingly indistinguishable 68 from advertising that is
technically express advocacy. Indeed, voters are often unable to determine

62. See, e.g., Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce v. Wisconsin Elections Bd., 978 F. Supp. 1200
(W.D. Wis. 1997) (describing a radio advertisement that urged listeners to call a candidate to "remind"
him that they want term limits).
63. See BECK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. Less than a third of the ads urging the audience to
communicate its views actually provided a telephone number or address for the viewer or listener to
contact. See id. at 8.
64. See Jeffrey D. Stanger& Douglas G. Rivlin, IssueAdvocacyAdvertisingDuringthe 1997-1998
Election Cycle (visited Mar. 20, 1999) <http:llappcpenn.org//issueads/report.htm>.
65. See id. The numbers are necessarily imprecise, and the identities of the sources of funds
unknown, because issue ads are not subject to reporting and disclosure requirements.
66. See Richard L. Berke, Interest GroupsPrepareto Spendon CampaignSpin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1998, at Al (reporting that issue advocacy spending by independent interest groups dominated
spending by candidates in a special election in a California congressional district); James Dao, Soft
Money Finds Its Way Into 2 Hard-FoughtRaces, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1997, at B6 (reporting that the
Republican National Committee was financing $750,000 in television commercials for issue ads against
the Democratic candidate in a New York congressional district special election).
67. See Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64.
68. Issue ads may be distinguishable in one respect: They are more likely to contain "pure
attack"-that is, messages that make a case against an opposing position or candidate, rather than
advocate the position supported by the ad's sponsor or compare opposing positions-than ads placed
by candidates. See BECK ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-10 (stating that 41% of issue ads were pure attack
ads, compared to 24% of presidential candidate ads); Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64 ("While only
23.9% of candidate ads attacked ....
51.5% of issue ads did so during the final two months of the
[campaign] cycle.")
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whether an ad is sponsored by a candidate or by an interest group.69 In
the first Annenberg study, less than 5% of the issue ads that aired in the
1996 campaign actually called for support or opposition to pending
By contrast, nearly 90% of the ads referred to public
legislation.7'
officials or candidates for office by name, and nearly 60% of the television
ads included pictures of officials or candidates.7" The second Annenberg
study found that more than 80% of the issue ads aired between September
1 and Election Day 1998 referred to candidates by name; only rarely did
issue advocacy campaigns interject new, independent opinions or reflect the
views of political outsiders.'
The 1996 Annenberg study found that more than 97% of issue
advertising was aligned with either Republican or Democratic positions.'
In fact, many of the leaders of issue advocacy organizations initially made
their careers in party politics and use the issue organizations to advance
partisan goals. Most notable among them are former Reagan political
director Lyn Nofziger, whose Citizens for the Republic spent more than $2
million on attack ads in the 1996 congressional election; Angela "Bay"
Buchanan, who participated in Nofziger's effort while serving as campaign
manager for the presidential primary bid of her brother Pat Buchanan; and
former Reagan political chair Peter Flaherty, who, as head of Citizens for
Reform, ran the anti-Yellowtail ad discussed at the outset of this article.74
In some cases, the political parties provided the issue groups with the
funds they needed to pay for their advertising. Americans for Tax Reform
funded its $4.6 million issue advocacy program in 1996 out of a transfer
from the Republican National Committee.75 More importantly, the two
major parties each spent tens of millions of dollars on issue advocacy in the
1996 and 1998 campaigns.76 Indeed, the two parties together appear to
have accounted for more than half the total of issue advocacy spending in

69. See David Magleby with Marianne Holt, Issue Advocacy in 1998 CongressionalElections, in
OUTSIDE MONEY: SOFT MONEY & ISSUE ADS IN COMPErITIVE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, A
REPORT OF A GRANT FUNDED BY THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 26-27 (David B. Magleby &
Marianne Holt, ed.) (suggesting that while federal election law requires candidate and non-candidate
sponsors to distinguish themselves in their campaign ads, the distinction fails to allay voter confusion
as to the source of the ads).
70. See BECK ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64.
73. See BECK Er AL., supra note 2, at 8.
74. See id. at 22; DREW, supra note 10, at 5-6, 22-28.
75. See BECK ET AL., supra note 2, at 16; DREw, supra note 10, at 223.
76. See BECK Er AL., supra note 2, at 3, 34, 55 (noting that in 1995 and 1996 the Democratic
National Committee spent $44 million on issue ads and in 1996 the Republican National Committee
spent $24 million on issue ads); Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64 (estimating that Democratic and
Republican parties accounted for 80.7% of the $275 to $340 million spent on issue advocacy
advertising during the 1997-1998 election cycle).
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the 1995-96 election cycle, and for 70% of the issue advocacy advertising
between September 1 and Election Day 1998.?
In reports released in the fall of 1998, FEC auditors determined that
in 1995-96 the Democratic National Committee (DNC) closely coordinated
$46 million in issue advocacy expenditures with the Clinton-Gore '96
campaign.78 The auditors found that the DNC and the Clinton campaign
worked together on the production and placement of television ads paid for
by the DNC, and that the DNC and the Clinton-Gore primary campaign
committee shared a standard form memorandum for authorization of
production and purchase of air time for media advertising: "One section of
% for the DNC
this memorandum states 'The cost will be allocated a
and
% for Clinton/Gore '96.' The next line states 'attorneys to
determine.' "" The FEC general counsel contended that "it is difficult to
distinguish between the activities of the DNC and the [Clinton] Primary
Committee with respect to the creation and publication of the media
advertisements at issue."' FEC auditors also found that the Republican
National Committee (RNC) paid more than $18 million directly and
through Republican state party committees on behalf of the Dole campaign
for ads that were aired between April and August 1996-a period in which
the Dole campaign was bumping up against the spending ceiling it had
accepted as a condition for prenomination public funding.8"
As a pragmatic matter, then, the current express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction serves less to assure a place for independent debate
concerning vital issues ignored by the major party candidates than to
facilitate the wholesale evasion of campaign finance laws by candidates,
parties, and interest groups.
Principle also calls for a reexamination of the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction. The current doctrine implicitly treats the regulation
77. See BECK ET AL., supra note 2, at 34, 55; Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64. Similar patterns
have developed in state races. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAs, THE DAY AFTER
REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 91 (1998).
78. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON CLINTON-GORE '96
PRIMARY COMMITTEE, INC. 24 (1998) [hereinafter CLINTON-GORE REPORT].
79. See id. at 18.
80. Id. at 108.
81. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AUDIT DIVISION ON THE DOLE FOR
PRESIDENT COMMITEE, INC. (PRIMARY) 16, 34-36, 46 (1998) [hereinafter DOLE REPORT].
The FEC staff determined that due to both the coordination between party committees and
candidate committees and the electioneering content of the party committee media ads, the DNC and
RNC had made expenditures on behalf of the Clinton and Dole campaigns, respectively, and that these
expenditures ought to be counted against the spending limits both candidates had agreed to accept as
a condition of public funding. The FEC staff recommended that the candidates pay to the Treasury a
portion of the spending beyond the spending limit-nearly $25 million. The FEC unanimously rejected
the staff recommendation and refused to order any repayments attributable to party issue advocacy
expenditures. See Jill Abramson, Election Panel Refuses to Order Repayments by Clinton and Dole,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at Al.
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of campaign finances as an obnoxious, minimally defensible exception to
the general rule of unrestricted political speech. The failure of campaign
finance rules limited to express advocacy to actually reach critical
campaign finance activities is almost celebrated as an illustration of just
how unrestricted political speech is. But this misses the distinctive role
that elections play in our system of democratic self-governance, as well as
the role campaign spending plays in elections. Elections are our central
form of collective political decision-making, and thus they are our most
important mechanism for securing democratically accountable government.
Campaign communications are a crucial part of elections, and, as the
Supreme Court has indicated, may be regulated in order to advance the
The Court has
goals of deliberative, democratic decision-making.
repeatedly determined that reporting and disclosure requirements,
contribution limitations, and restrictions on the political activities of
corporations ensure the ability of elections to function as an institution of
democratic self-governance. 2
Campaign finance regulation ought not to be seen as a disfavored
exception from the general rule of unregulated political behavior, but
instead as part of the electoral process-a process which, by its very
nature, requires a considerable degree of regulation. Both the regulation
of elections and the protection of speech reflect important constitutional
values. The existence of a distinctive jurisprudential regime for election
speech makes the location of the line that distinguishes electoral speech
from other political speech very important. The placement of the
election/politics line should not focus exclusively on the values on the
politics side of the line, but should attend to the vital interests at stake on
both sides of the line.
III. The Jurisprudence of Elections
This Part suggests that there is a distinctive jurisprudence of elections,
sketches some of its elements, and indicates how that jurisprudence has
sustained a considerable degree of government regulation of the electoral
process. Subpart A examines a basic feature of the jurisprudence of
elections: the balancing of individual rights and collective choice. Subpart
B suggests that due to the mix of individual and collective concerns, the
Supreme Court has been willing to accord a measure of discretion to the

82. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990)
(upholding a prohibition on corporate expenditures from the general fund supporting or opposing a
candidate); California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1981)
(upholding the FECA's maximum contribution limit imposed upon unincorporated associations
contributing to multicandidate political committees); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976)
(concluding that the "governmental interests sought to be vindicated" by the FECA disclosure
requircments are sufficiently important to withstand First Amendment challenges).
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political branches in regulating the electoral process. Subpart C considers
how the Supreme Court has determined the scope of this distinctive
jurisprudence of elections outside the campaign finance setting. Subpart D
explores the implications of the jurisprudence of elections for campaign
finance regulation.
A.

Individual Rights and Collective Choice

There is a distinctive jurisprudence of elections that attempts to
reconcile strong protection for individual rights of political participation
with the collective social interest in organizing the process of public choice.
The jurisprudence of elections proceeds from the special constitutional
protection accorded the right to vote. The right to vote, according to the
Supreme Court, provides "a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live."' As the Supreme
Court noted in Reynolds v. Sims: 4 "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is
a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.... [T]he right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights."' Consequently, restrictions on the
right to vote are subject to exacting judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 6 The First Amendment also protects political activity
incident to an election, including the nomination of candidates, the
organization of parties, and the placement of candidates on the ballot.'
Yet, the Supreme Court has "emphasized on numerous occasions the
breadth of power enjoyed by the States in determining voter qualifications
and the manner of elections."88 The right to vote is not simply a matter
of individual political participation. It takes on its significance because of
its role in our system of democratic collective self-governance. As the
Court has observed, "the right to vote is the right to participate in an
electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of

83. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
84. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. Id. at 561-62.
86. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966) (restating that
the right to vote is a fundamental right in any "'free and democratic society'" and declaring that "where
fundamental rights... are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized").
87. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(invalidating various state requirements concerning party organization); Tashjian v. Republican Party
of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,215-16 (1986) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the party from enabling
independents to vote in its primary); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983) (invalidating
Ohio's early filing deadline for independent presidential candidates); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
31 (1968) (holding that an Ohio law inhibiting the ability of new political parties to gain access to an
election ballot unconstitutionally burdened both the right to vote and the right to associate).
88. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 (1972).
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the democratic system. 8 9 Government regulation of the electoral process
is not antithetical to freedom of political expression and association.
Rather, the Court has declared, "reasonable regulations of parties, elections
and ballots " ' are necessary to make an election work as a mechanism for
aggregating diverse preferences into results that reflect majority sentiment,
command public support, and produce an effective, accountable
government.
Unlike general political activity, an election produces a result that
binds an entire polity. People can and will disagree about matters subject
to debate; majority views must coexist with dissenting opinions. But
electoral outcomes govern the entire polity, the losers as well as the
winners. Elections choose the public officers who make, enforce, or
adjudicate laws, or, in the case of ballot propositions, they actually enact
laws directly. The election's outcome directly affects what government
does thereafter. That is, of course, the whole point of having an election.
Elections transform a multiplicity of voices into an instrument of
governance. Freedom of expression and association are a vital part of the
electoral process. Voters must be free to put forward and consider a range
of alternatives and to seek to persuade their fellow voters concerning their
electoral choices. But the fact that winners and losers are bound alike by
the electoral outcome creates the need for rules that both protect the rights
of individuals and ensure the fairness and integrity of the process as a
whole, thus enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the government that
results.
Elections also have a distinctive timing. The marketplace of ideas is
always open. A speaker whose views are rebuffed by society today may
continue to articulate his views and seek acceptance tomorrow. But
elections occur at a moment in time. In our nonparliamentary system that
moment is fixed and regular. For all federal and most state offices
Election Day is at the beginning of November in an even-numbered year.
Primary Election Days vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but the day is
usually fixed and regularly recurring within a particular jurisdiction. Once
Election Day passes, the election is over and the question of who will be
a party nominee or who will hold a contested public office is resolved until
the next election.
Like the binding effect, the precise and temporal nature of an election
places a premium on rules that promote careful and considered choice, a
fair and effective electoral process, and a politically legitimate result. New
developments, changes in opinion about election issues, and even new
information about old events that comes to light after Election Day can

89. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).
90. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997).
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change voters' minds about what should have happened in the election, but
they cannot change the election's result. Moreover, the regular, fixed
temporal location of Election Day serves to concentrate public attention on
election-related concerns in the weeks and days immediately preceding the
election. Political activity and discussion of political issues may occur at
any time of the year; but the period immediately before an election is the
distinctive time in which people do most of their information-gathering,
thinking, and arguing about how they are going to vote. And it is the time
in which they are most attentive to election-related messages. Indeed, this
is often a period in which other political activity drops off as people and
organizations interested in politics focus their energies on the election.
B.

Election Regulation and ConstitutionalLine-Drawing

Elections require mechanisms for achieving a democratic collective
result. There must be rules for determining eligibility to participate,
setting the electoral agenda, sequencing the comparison of electoral
alternatives, and focusing electoral deliberation. In a polity characterized
by a multiplicity of voters who, with varying degrees of intensity, hold
conflicting views across a wide range of issues, there is no one right
mechanism for calculating collective preferences. Different electoral rules
and procedures will give different weights to various conflicting but
legitimate substantive values, such as political stability and responsiveness
to change, majority rule, and minority representation. The rules for
electoral choice will inevitably affect electoral outcomes. They may
constrain election-related political activity. They will also be, at least in
part, the product of political judgments. Most importantly, the rules for
running an election-for determining who can run for office, who can vote
in what election, and who can nominate whom-run head-on into
associational and free speech rights.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area reflects the dilemma
that democracy needs rules, but the notion of democracy does not itself
determine what those rules will be. The strict scrutiny that courts apply
when reviewing government efforts to regulate political speech and
association is in tension with the basic indeterminacy concerning what
principles should govern the electoral process. Given the multiple,
conflicting values at stake, it would be difficult to show that any particular
rule, including rules that regulate election-related political expression, are
strictly necessary for democratic decision-making. Perhaps as a result,
strict judicial scrutiny of laws regulating elections is not always invoked
and, as shown below, even when it is invoked it is not always applied.
The Court has often deferred to legislatures to determine the
substantive values a polity may seek to advance through its election rules.
For example, the avoidance of factionalism and the narrowing of choice in
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order to produce a majority (rather than a plurality) winner have repeatedly
been treated as legitimate electoral goals. 9' When a state asserts these and
other interests allegedly connected to the effective functioning of the
electoral process as a justification for a particular election regulation, the
Court has often accepted the claims uncritically, relaxing the burden on the
state to prove that a restriction on election-related political activity is
necessary to advance such an election-related interest, and has discarded
the narrow-tailoring requirement. As the Court stated in Munro v.
Socialist Wbrkers Party,92 "[w]e have never required a State to make a
particularized showing of the existence" of the factors-such as voter
confusion, ballot overcrowding, or frivolous candidacies-that have been93
held to justify restrictions on the listing of candidates on the ballot.
Similarly, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,94 the Court found
that a state could bar one party from nominating the candidate of another
party without providing "empirical verification of the weightiness of the
State's asserted justifications" of avoiding voter confusion and preventing
party splintering.'
Despite the fundamental rights at stake, the Court has often expressed
a preference for contextualized approaches and balancing tests rather than
per se rules. The doctrine governing ballot-access restrictions on third
parties and independents, for example, "provides no litmus-paper test for
separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are
invidious.... Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a
'matter of degree.'"96 In Timmons the Court observed that "[n]o bright
line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional
infringements on First Amendment freedoms. " 9
To be sure, state discretion is not unlimited and even fuzzy lines can
have bite. The Court has been especially concerned to protect the equal
right to vote in the face of other asserted state interests. States may not
limit the electorate, dilute the representation of minority groups, unduly
constrain electoral competition, or exclude new parties or independents
who demonstrate some substantial support. 9 Still, what is striking about

91. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986) (holding that avoidance of
"unrestrained factionalism at the general election" justified Washington State's restrictions on ballot
access); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (conceding that a state has "an interest in
attempting to see that the election winner be the choice of a majority of its voters").
92. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
93. Id. at 194-95.
94. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
95. Id. at364.
96. Storer v.Brown,415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348
(1972)).
97. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359.
98. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1969) (finding ballot access laws unconstitutional
because they made it "virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republican
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the jurisprudence of elections is the Court's willingness to let legislatures
determine some of the substantive values that election rules may advance
and, at times, to defer to legislatures in setting the balance between
individual rights and the need to organize collective decision-making.
The Court's deference may sometimes go too far. Certainly, the
Court's willingness to sustain state laws that bolster the two major parties
has been cogently criticized for "entrenching the duopoly" 99 and for
permitting "partisan lockups of the democratic process."" Nevertheless,
although particular decisions may be wrong, the Court's recognition that
election rules vindicate collective interests as well as individual rights is
correct. This insight should affect not only the substance of constitutional
doctrine but the nature of constitutional line-drawing as well. In the
absence of clear, incontestable principles for organizing elections
governments may need more discretion in structuring elections than in
regulating other political activity.
C. Locating the Election/PoliticsLine
Election-related activities are different, and necessarily subject to more
regulation, than other forms of political activity. What are the implications
of the distinctive nature of elections for where and how the
elections/politics line is to be drawn?
One possibility is that given the dangers inherent in governmental
regulation of the political process, an election ought to be defined very
narrowly, and treated as an unusual and highly insulated exception to the
general rule that political activity is protected from regulation. The
Supreme Court has frequently taken this approach, thus implying that the
domain of elections ought to be tightly focused on the casting and counting
of ballots.
Certainly, balloting is at the heart of the electoral process. The Court
has been most zealous in defense of individual election-related rights when
a state law would interfere with the right of an otherwise qualified citizen
to cast a ballot."0 ' On the other hand, it has been relatively deferential
and Democratic Parties"). For a discussion of these other constitutional concerns involved in elections,
see infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenchingthe Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should
Not Allow the States to Protectthe Democrats and Republicansfrom PoliticalCompetition, 1997 sup.
CT. REv. 331.
100. See generallySamuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets:PartisanLockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
101. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (finding unconstitutional the denial of the
right to vote based on a one-year residency requirement); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 626-27 (1969) (determining that a requirement that citizens either rent or own land or have a child
in school in order to vote in a school district election is unconstitutional); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding poll taxes unconstitutional); see also Pamela S. Karlan,
The Rights to Vote: Some PessimismAbout Formalism,71 TEXAs L. REv. 1705, 1709, 1709-12 (1993)
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to state laws that restrict the inclusion of candidates' names on ballots."°
In Burson v. Freeman,'0 3 the Court extended the notion of the ballot to
include the place and time of balloting, stressing the close connection
between casting a ballot and the place of balloting."°
The law in
Burson banned electioneering within one hundred feet of a polling
place. 5 It was a content-based prohibition on speech, but the restriction
on political activity was not subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court
applied the more relaxed standard that it applies to laws that limit the
placement of candidates and parties on the ballot"° and deferred to the
state "as [the] recognized administrator of elections.""' 7
The ballot is surely the fulcrum of an election, but it is not the
election tout court. Elections entail the casting and counting of ballots, but
for the election to serve as a mechanism of collective choice there must be
considerable election-related activity before balloting can occur.
Candidates test the waters, seek support, sound their themes, and announce
their candidacies for nomination. Over time, some candidates drop away,
others gather strength. As the number of candidates is winnowed down to
a relative handful, and Election Day approaches, voters can focus on the
finalists. During the election campaign, candidates, parties, interest groups
and interested individuals undertake efforts to persuade the voters how to
cast their ballots. The campaign period enables voters to inform
themselves about the candidates and decide how they will vote. The
election campaign is, thus, a central part of the process of structured choice
and democratic deliberation that constitutes an election. A fair opportunity
for all participants in the electoral process to present arguments to the
voters is critical to the legitimacy of the election as a mechanism of
collective decision-making.
The Court has often defined an election broadly to include preElection Day activities or has deferred to statutes that regulate pre-Election
Day activities as part of the electoral process. In Terry v. Adams, 08 for
example, the Court treated private political activity that preceded an
election, and informally but effectively supplanted that election, as a part

(explaining that the Court has applied strict scrutiny in voting cases involving participation, which is
defined as "the right to cast a ballot that is counted").
102. But see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1968) (holding that restrictive ballot access
laws violate the Equal Protection Clause when the burden they impose on voting and associational
rights rises to invidious discrimination).
103. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
104. Id. at211.
105. Id. at 193-94.
106. See id. at 209.
107. Id. at211.
108. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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of the election in order to protect the equal right to vote.'°9 The Court
has indicated that Congress can treat party nomination procedures as part
of an election"' and that Congress can use the notion of a pre-election
campaign season to define the obligations of broadcasters."' The Court
has also indicated that the rules that translate Election Day results into the
structure of government are part of the election: the one person, one vote
doctrine," 2 the minority vote dilution doctrine, 3 and the judicial
review of partisan gerrymandering" 4 all grow out of the right to vote
even though none of these doctrines concern Election Day activities.
Finally, due to the nexus between voting and representation, legislative
apportionment has become part of the domain of elections." 5
Tb be sure, the ballot nicely symbolizes the mix of individual and
collective concerns at stake in the regulation of elections. Indeed, as the
Court noted in Burson, the state-created ballot is itself an artifact of the
state's involvement in the electoral process." 6 The state-created ballot
promotes the integrity of elections by safeguarding voter choice from
private interference. Yet, by requiring voters to use an official, statecontrolled ballot, states have displaced the role of parties, candidates, and
individual voters in preparing ballots and in framing the choices available
to the electorate. The questions concerning which candidates and parties

109. Id. at 466 (upholding the lower court's reliance upon the principle stated in Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944), that the "right to participate in the choice of elected officials
without restriction by any State because of race. . . is not to be nullified by a State through casting
its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in
the election").
110. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 218 n.31 (1996).
111. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 368-88, 396-97 (1981) (declaring that Congress may
require broadcast networks to give federal candidates reasonable access during election campaigns and
that the FCC has the statutory authority to determine when a campaign has begun for purposes of
enforcing the reasonable access rule).
112. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("Mf a State should provide that the votes
of citizens in one part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of
votes of citizens in auother part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those
residing iu the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.").
113. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-22 (1982) (observing that at-large votiug systems
may be used to miuimize the voting streugth of minority groups); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-770 (1973) (noting that multimember districts can minimize the voting strength of minorities).
114. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 120, 118-21 (1986) (upholding the justiciability of
claims that political gerrymandering "dilute[s] the vote of political groups").
115. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550 (1969) (establishing that a state
amendment providing county supervisious with the option to allow the board of supervisors to be
elected at-large rather than by district is subject to the purview of The Voting Rights Act of 1965);
Karlau, supra note 101, at 1717, 1712-17 (asserting that voters are concerned with "direct and virtual
reprcsentation" as well as "aggregation rules within the legislature because these rules can determiue
the practical effectiveness of the representatives who champiou [their] interests").
116. Burson, 504 U.S. at200-06 (examiniug the history of election regulation in the United States
leading to the adoption of the state-created secret ballot).
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can be listed on ballots, whether states can limit the ability of parties to
endorse the candidates of other parties, and whether states must count
write-in ballots arise solely because of the state's displacement of privately
provided ballots with the state's ballot. The state-created ballot, like many
voting rules, simultaneously constrains and advances collective choice. But
the ballot is not all there is to an election, and the election certainly
includes campaign activity that precedes the casting of ballots.
With the election not limited to the act of balloting, there is no
obvious definition of when an election begins or ends. Drawing the
election/politics line requires a contextualized assessment of the relationship
between the law or practice at issue and the role of the election as a
mechanism for the creation of a democratically accountable government.
Like some of the rules internal to the law of elections, the scope of the law
of elections is more a matter of degree than of bright lines. Certainly, the
closer a practice is to casting a ballot, the easier it is to treat as part of the
election. But the real test is how closely connected the activity is to the
values and concerns central to elections-values like political equality,
openness to participation, informed deliberation, and structured choicerather than to the ballot itself.

D.

CampaignFinance Regulation

What are the implications of the jurisprudence of elections for the
regulation of campaign finance? Some of the basic concerns of election
law-openness to participation, informed choice, political equality, and the
impact of the election on representative governance-are implicated by
campaign finance regulation. The centerpiece of the Buckley doctrine-that
"contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most
fundamental First Amendment activities"" 7-grows out of the role the
campaign plays in enabling an election to be a mechanism for democratic
choice. Candidates and others with an interest in the outcome of an
election need to be able to communicate their views to the voters. More
importantly, the legitimacy of decision-making by election turns on the
ability of voters to receive the information they need to cast informed
votes. Money is not speech, but in a large and heterogeneous society,
money can play an important role in disseminating election-related
information to the voters. Of course, strict scrutiny of limitations on
campaign expenditures does not exactly distinguish election-related activity
from political activity in general. Buckley expressly linked election

117. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
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expenditures to the broad protection the First Amendment generally affords
political speech and association." 8 Yet, strict scrutiny of limitations on
campaign activity is also consistent with the notion that there is a
distinctive jurisprudence of elections under which an opportunity for wideopen campaigning is essential to the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the
election as a mechanism for collective choice.
By the same token, the Court's validation of some forms of campaign
finance regulation represents a departure from the general rules respecting
political speech, and suggests a concern for the distinctive role that
elections play in our political system. Buckley's approval of contribution
limits" 9 must be attributable to the view that such limits advance the
central purpose of an election: the selection of the officials who will
constitute a government. To be sure, one strand of Buckley and subsequent
campaign finance cases denigrated contributions as a lower order of
indirect speech-"speech by proxy. "120
But this never seemed
persuasive, given both the need for contributions to fund expenditures and
the role of contributions in political association.' 2 ' Rather, it is the other
strand of the analysis-the concern that campaign finance rules affect the
behavior of government-that sustains the Court's approval of contribution
limits despite their impact on political speech and association. Large
private contributions raise the danger that officeholders will be too attentive
to the interests of donors and prospective donors and insufficiently
concerned about the public interest. Campaign contributions may be
limited, according to Buckley, not because they are not political speech, but
because a "political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders"
to donors and potential donors threatens "the integrity of our system of
representative democracy." I
Similarly, the collective nature of electoral choice, as well as the
connection between elections and office holding, plays a role in the Court's
willingness to sustain rules requiring donors in the electoral context to
disclose their identities. Despite their potential for infringing on privacy

118. Id. at 14-15.
119. Id. at 20.
120. See California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196(1981) (plurality
opinion) (stating that this type of speech is "not the sort of political advocacy ... entitled to full First
Amendment protection"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
121. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
251-56 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion and O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (describing the significant burden the FEC's regulation might impose on the ability of
corporations to make political contributions and, consequently, on their rights of political association);
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981) (holding that the right
to pool money through contributions is an important part of freedom of association).
122. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
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of association and belief, disclosure requirements can be an important
source of voter information. As Buckley put it:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate" in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek
.. . office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political
spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of
party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's
financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a
candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate
predictions of future performance in office."2
It is uncertain whether the benefits of increased information would offset
the chilling effect of disclosure in an ordinary political speech context.
The Court has certainly suggested otherwise. 24 But in the electoral
setting, voter choice is not just a matter of personal information and belief.
Instead, citizens as voters are under a political obligation to make choices
that inevitably bind the polity as a whole and set the course of government
for the next political term. There is a collective interest in increasing the
amount of relevant information available to the voters in the hope of
improving the quality of collective decision-making.
Buckley even upheld FECA's provisions requiring disclosure of the
names and addresses of people who make independent expenditures or who
contribute to organizations that make such expenditures."z The Court
sustained these rules although it had already concluded that independent
spending presented no danger of corruption and that there was a distinct
possibility that disclosure might chill such independent activity. The
Court's rationale was that such disclosure "increases the fund of
information concerning those who support the candidates." 26 This
"informational interest" in the sources of independent spending can be as
strong as the interest in the sources of candidates' funds because disclosure

123. Id. at 66-67 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
124. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the Court held that a state
law requiring campaign literature to include the name and address of the issuer violates the First
Amendment. McIntyre involved a handbill distributed in the context of a referendum. The Court was
careful to distinguish the constitutional issues posed by such a disclosure requirement in a ballot
proposition election from an election involving candidates; the Court specifically distinguished the
portion of Buckley that sustained the FECA provision applying reporting and disclosure requirements
to independent expenditures. Id. at 355-56. The Court also indicated that Ohio's "compelled selfidentification on all election-related writings" imposed a far greater burden on First Amendment rights
than FECA's requirements, which involved reporting campaign finance data to the FEC. Id. Still, it
is fair to say that McIntyre placed far greater weight on the anti-corruption function of disclosure and
less on its informational value than did Buckley.
125. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80-81.
126. Id. at 81.
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by independent committees "helps voters to define more of the candidates'
constituencies. "127
The Court's deference to Congress's judgment concerning the specific
dollar limitations on contributions and the thresholds for reporting and
disclosure resembles the Court's deference to political judgments
concerning line-drawing in other areas of election regulation. In upholding
FECA~s limits on donations and the Act's low reporting and record
keeping thresholds, the Buckley Court stated that "we cannot require
Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable
threshold."128
That "line" was "best left ...
to congressional
9
discretion."
It was upheld because it was not "wholly without
rationality, " "' a standard even more relaxed than that used in reviewing
ballot access rules in the cases previously discussed."' The Court has
also deferred to congressional judgments that certain campaign finance
restrictions are constitutionally appropriate not because of their direct
effects in preventing corruption or informing voters, but because of their
indirect benefits in preventing evasion or circumvention of the regulations
that directly address the prevention of corruption and the provision of
election-related information.132
A central concern of election law is equality of participation. Equality
concerns play out differently in the campaign finance context than in other
areas of election law, such as the right to vote or to be a candidate. In
those areas, a concern for political equality has been used to strike down
laws restricting participation. 33 But in the campaign finance setting,
equality is often asserted as a justification for spending restrictions that
limit participation. Such egalitarian restriction may be justified, but it is
certainly in tension with the goals of wide-open political participation and
electoral communication. It is simply unclear how far the notion of
political equality sustains or requires limits on the election-related uses of
unequal, private resources.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 83.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
132. See California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98, (1981)
(npholding limits on the amount of money a person may contribute to a multicandidate political
committee in order to prevent circumvention of the limits on individual donations to candidates that
were sustained in Buckley).
133. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969) (determining that
a requirement that citizens either rent or own land or have a child in school in order to vote in a school
district election is unconstitutional); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670
(1966) (restating that the right to vote is a fundamental right in any "'free and democratic society'" and
declaring that "where fundamental rights . .. are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or rcstrain them must be closely scrutinized").
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This uncertainty about the meaning of equality is reflected in campaign
finance doctrine. Buckley announced that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment," "
and proceeded to invalidate FECA's limits on expenditures by candidates
and independent spenders.135 Yet, the Court has upheld federal and state
restrictions on expenditures by business corporations on the theory that the

financial resources these organizations can deploy for political purposes
36
"have little or no correlation to the public's support for [their] ideas."1

Prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds1 37 to finance campaign
expenditures "ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas espoused by corporations." 38 To be sure, the Court
1 39
linked these restrictions to the assertedly "unique state-conferred"
advantages that enable corporations to "amass large treasuries," and it
resolutely opposed the imposition of limits on expenditures by other
campaign participants"4 such as wealthy individuals, where there may be
a similar gap between the funds available for election-related activity and
the extent of public support for the positions espoused by the spenders.

134. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
135. Id. at 51.
136. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
137. Typically, the prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for electoral purposes is
accompanied by permission for the corporation to set up a separate, segregated fund-more colloquially
known as a political action committee (PAC)-which may solicit persons affiliated with the corporation,
such as officers, directors, or shareholders, for funds that may then be used for election contributions
and expenditures. A similar restriction on the use of treasury funds, in tandem with permission to
create a PAC, applies to unions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a),(b)(2)(C) (1994). In theory, the funds
contributed to a corporate or union PAC rcflect support by the individuals solicited for the electoral
goals of the PAC rather than simply the size of the corporate or union treasury. See id. § 441(b)(3)
(1994).
138. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. By a pragmatic political symmetry, the FECA prohibits the use of
both corporate and union treasury funds for federal campaign activities. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a),
(b)(2)(C) (1994). There has been no post-Buckley decision that directly addresses the application of
that prohibition to unions. In FederalElection Commission v. NationalRight to Work Committee, 459
U.S. 197, 207-11 (1982), the Court reviewed the history of these restrictions and indicated that the
restraints on unions continue to be valid, less because of the "substantial aggregations of wealth
amassed by the special advantages that go with the corporate form," but because such restrictions
"protect the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the
support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may
be opposed." Id. at 207-08. In Austin, however, the Court had before it a Michigan statute that
restricted corporations but not unions. When the Michigan Chamber of Commerce attacked the law
as fatally underinclusive, the Court sustained the distinction, finding that "the funds available for a
union's political activities more accurately reflects [sic] members' support for the organization's
political views than does a corporation's general treasury." Austin, 494 U.S. at 666. There is, thus,
no clear post-Buckley position on the constitutional status of restrictions on union campaign finance
activities.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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The Court's decisions validating restrictions on corporate activities
suggest that the place of equality in campaign finance law is not fully
resolved. 4 But the campaign finance cases reflect the other central
election law concerns with the function of an election in creating an
effective, politically accountable government. Reporting and disclosure
requirements have been held to advance that function by increasing the
prospects for informed choice. Similarly, contribution restrictions have
been sustained on the theory that they reduce the danger that the campaign
finance process will make elected officials too attentive to their financial
backers' private interests.
The scope of constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulation
is determined not just by the substantive values of campaign finance law,
but by the definition of which finance practices are considered to be a part
of the election campaign. The current use of "express advocacy" to
determine which contributions and expenditures are campaign related is an
open invitation to circumvention. The legal definition of election-related
speech needs to be redrawn in light of the principles underlying election
regulation. Reconsidering express advocacy is also necessary to vindicate
the more basic principle that if an activity may be subject to regulation then
it ought to be subject to effective regulation.
IV. Express Advocacy Reconsidered
The definition of election-related speech should reflect the concerns
that justify campaign finance regulation. Under Buckley, these concerns
include providing voters with information about those who are spending
money to influence the outcome of an election, curtailing the potential
effects of large contributions on officeholders, and restricting the ability of
corporations and unions to convert treasury funds into election war chests.
At bottom, all three goals enhance the central purpose of elections: the
aggregation of popular preferences into a government. Disclosure affects
voter choice, and voters' choices ultimately bind other voters by producing
a government for the entire polity. Contribution limits are set in light of
the effect campaign finance practices may have on the government that
emerges from the election. Limits on corporate and union war chests are
intended to prevent corporate and union treasury funds from distorting

141. There is also a tension within the Court's treatment of corporation campaign finance activity.
Compare Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (upholding a Michigan prohibition on the use of corporate treasury
funds in candidate elections), and Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 210-11 (1982) (arguing that the potential influence of corporations on elections "may require
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process" (quoting
California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))), with First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978) (holding that, in ballot proposition elections,
corporate political speech is protected by the First Amendment).
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election results by making them less representative of popular sentiment.
All three justifications for regulation, then, grow out of the connections
among campaign finance practices, electoral decision-making, election
results, and the role of elections in creating and shaping government. The
definition of election-related speech, subject to disclosure or limitation,
should take these concerns into account.
The definition of election-related speech must also be consistent with
the First Amendment values that led the Court to adopt the express
advocacy standard in the first place. Certainly, the definition should avoid
vagueness. Vague standards chill speech that could not be constitutionally
proscribed, can lead to an unnecessary and excessive reduction in political
activity, and vest considerable discretion in administrators and courts.
Vague standards force speakers to divert precious funds from
communicating political messages to retaining lawyers and litigating cases.
Moreover, clarity ought to be a goal of election regulation even apart from
the First Amendment. To be effective, election regulation ought to
proceed in "real time"-that is, in the heat of the political campaign. It
would be far better if mandatory disclosures were made, and contribution
limits and corporate spending prohibitions observed, during the election
campaign than if these rules were honored only by the imposition of fines
and penalties years after Election Day. Clear rules facilitate compliance
and enforcement as well as avoid chilling effects.
Similarly, the test should not include an intrusive evaluation of the
speaker's intent. A test that depended, for example, on a judgment of
whether the speaker intended to influence the election would introduce
many of the same pitfalls as vagueness. While it may be fair to assume
that a speaker knows what he or she intends to achieve, no speaker can be
confident of what some governmental entity might conclude as to intent.
So a test based on intent carries some of the same dangers of chilling,
litigiousness, and delayed enforcement as does a vague standard.
Moreover, it introduces an additional danger of governmental inquiries into
the inner political motives of an individual or into the internal
communications of an organization.
Finally, the test should focus on speech that is part of the election
campaign, without sweeping into the regulatory realm too much political
speech that is unrelated to elections. To use the legal jargon, the definition
should not be overbroad. A test, for example, that treated as election
related any ad that mentioned the name of a candidate, no matter when that
ad was aired, would be overbroad. It would restrict all sorts of political
speech-discussion of the McCain-Feingold Bill or the Hyde Amendment,
for example-that may not be part of an electoral contest. That is not to
say that a law defining electoral speech would be invalid because one could
imagine an ad that technically falls within the definition but is unlikely to
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affect voting decisions. Rather, the First Amendment requires only that the
law be drawn in a way that minimizes the likelihood that this negative
effect will occur.
Buckley's bright-line express advocacy standard satisfies each of these
criteria. But the Buckley test's exclusive focus on the presence of words
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
has proven inadequate to the task of defining election-related speech in the
context of contemporary election campaigns. There are other ways of
avoiding vagueness, examination of a speaker's intentions, and overbreadth
without limiting the inquiry to the presence of literal words of advocacy in
the script of the speaker's ad.
To frame a test that more accurately maps the election/politics divide
requires some attention to the context of the communication. As even
Judge Homby, a zealous defender of a narrow definition of express
advocacy, has acknowledged, "it is a commonplace that the meaning of
words is not fixed, but depends heavily on context as well as the shared
assumptions of speaker and listener." 42 The meaning of content is
shaped by context, and the impact of a communication will be affected by
its context. Context and content together are necessary to assess whether
a communication is election related. But to avoid vagueness and frame a
test that is easy to apply, the test should incorporate only those features of
the context that are easy to measure, are obvious to the speakers, and
determine whether the communication is likely to affect the outcome of an
election.
What does it mean to say that a communication is part of an election?
Consistent with the avoidance of vagueness and of unnecessary restrictions
on non-election-related behavior, a legislature should be permitted to define
as part of the election those communications that refer to the participants
in the election, occur during the election, and have characteristics that
make them reasonably likely to have some impact on the outcome of the
election. "Reasonably likely" means possible, not probable. It can never
be certain before an election which activities will affect the result. On the
other hand, it does not include communications that are likely to have little
effect. Nor does the notion of possible effect refer to the outcome of a
particular election; one election may be a foregone conclusion that would
not be affected by any political activity, while another election may be so
tight that truly trivial activities could have decisive impact. Rather, the
focus should be on a class of similar elections, such as races for the House
of Representatives.
If there is some reasonable likelihood that a
communication could affect the outcome of a class of elections then a
legislature should be permitted to treat it as part of an election.

142. Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Me.
1996), aff'd 98 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1996).
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Whether a communication should be treated as part of an election
campaign for purposes of campaign finance regulation (including disclosure
rules, contribution limits, and rules governing the use of corporate and
union treasury funds) should turn primarily on three criteria: (i) content,
(ii) timing, and (iii) the amount of money involved. Obviously, if a
communication includes the magic words of express advocacy, it may be
regulated regardless of when it airs or how much it costs. But beyond that,
a legislature should be permitted to broaden the definition of electoral
speech so long as it sensitively defines these three criteria in a way that
permits effective regulation, avoids vagueness, and protects non-electionrelated speech.
Specifically, it should be constitutional to adopt a definition that
regulates as election speech any communication that (i) refers to a clearly
identified candidate; (ii) is made within a defined period before an election
(probably four weeks before a general election and two weeks before a
primary); and (iii) involves a sufficiently large expenditure-at least one
percent, and possibly at least five percent-of the average expenditure of
the winning candidate for the office in question in the two preceding
elections.
In addition, there need to be specific rules for two regularly recurring
situations: advertising by major political parties, and voter guides issued
by organizations interested in political issues. Given the nature of our
parties, major-party advertising which refers to a clearly identified
candidate ought to be treated as electoral communication no matter when
it occurs. Expenditures for voter guides should be treated as part of an
organization's internal communications, and therefore exempt from
regulation regardless of their references to candidates, timing, or cost, to
the extent that the voter guide is distributed to the organization's
membership or to regular recipients of the organization's publications.
Additional expenditures to distribute the voter guide to a wider public
should be treated as electoral communications to the extent that they satisfy
the three elements of reference to a candidate, timing, and amount.
Such a standard is clear, easy to enforce, and tightly focused on
speech that has the potential to influence an election. It places a minimal
burden on issue-oriented organizations. It targets the sophisticated political
participants best able to accommodate their actions to legal requirements.
It is unlikely to chill any non-electoral speech, and it respects the
associational autonomy of politically active groups.
It is surely
underinclusive, particularly in its temporal definition of the electoral
campaign and its exclusion of voter guides distributed within an
organization, but that represents a necessary accommodation to First
Amendment values. In any event, this test would come a lot closer to
accurately mapping the election/politics distinction, and thereby vindicating
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the purposes of election regulation, than does the existing definition of
express advocacy.
A.

Content: Clearly Identified Candidate

This component of the test corresponds to one element of the existing
express advocacy doctrine. Some reference to a clearly identified candidate
is necessary to distinguish election-related communication from other forms
of political speech. 43 If no reference to a candidate were required, the
test would be far too open-ended and would easily encompass pure
discussions of political issues. A clear reference to a candidate-either
naming the candidate or using the candidate's likeness-is, thus, a
necessary condition for regulation even if it is not sufficient to distinguish
electoral from other political speech. Some reference to a candidate is also
required to put speakers and broadcasters on notice that their messages are
subject to regulation. Finally, despite the increasing sophistication of
campaign advertising, it seems unlikely that a message that makes no
reference at all to a clearly identified candidate will have a significant
impact on an election."
Virtually all of the blatant uses of issue advocacy to avoid campaign
finance regulation in the 1996 election involved use of a candidate's name
or likeness. As the 1996 Annenberg study found, hardly any so-called
issue advocacy advertising actually discussed issues without mentioning
candidates. 45
Conversely, a group or individual interested in
communicating views to the public on a political issue could avoid
regulation simply by avoiding reference to a candidate. There is no
vagueness and no need to analyze the intent of the speaker.
Should a communication explicitly call for the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate, then there would be no problem regulating it,
as Buckley currently provides that such a statement is express
advocacy.Y Yet, not all communications that refer to a candidate ought
to be treated as part of an election campaign: a candidate's name may be
mentioned in passing as part of a shorthand reference to pending legislation
or a political program, such as the McCain-Feingold bill or the Clinton
health care plan. An organization should be able to use a candidate's name
or likeness in order to underscore what the organization opposes, build

143. This test is aimed at a demarcation of the elections/politics distinction in the context of
elections for public office. Consideration of the elections/politics distinction in the context of voting
on ballot propositions is beyond the scope of this article.
144. Given the central role of the major political parties in elections, it might be constitutionally
permissible to treat clear references to a groupof candidates by party affliation-"House Republicans"
or even "Democrats"-as tantamount to references to those candidates by name.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
146. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976).
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membership, and rally support-such as when liberal organizations attack
Newt Gingrich or Jesse Helms, and conservative organizations attack Bill
Clinton or Ted Kennedy-without being automatically subject to election
regulation. 41 7
Reference to a candidate is, thus, a necessary but not sufficient
condition for election regulation. On the other hand, the requirement of
express advocacy-a literal exhortation to vote for or against a candidateis so easy to evade that many election-related statements concerning
candidates will be exempt from coverage.
Following Furgatch, some proposed campaign finance reforms would
continue to focus primarily on the content of the speech, but would permit
greater interpretation of that content "with limited reference to external
events such as proximity to the election."" 4 Thus, the FEC has by
regulation defined express advocacy to include communications which
[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited reference to external
events, such as proximity to the election, could only be interpreted
by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or
defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) because (1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable,
unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages
actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s)
49
or encourage some other kind of action. 1
The House of Representatives used similar language in one of several
alternative definitions of express advocacy in the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 1998,150 which passed the House in the summer
of 1998. Under Shays-Meehan, an election-related communication is one
that advocates the election or defeat of a candidate by "expressing
unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more
clearly identified candidates when taken as a whole and with limited
reference to external events, such as proximity to an election."..
The FEC and Shays-Meehan definitions of express advocacy provide
a good measure of election-related speech, but they would be difficult to
apply during the heat of election, are open to considerable variation in
interpretation, and rely so heavily on adjectives like "unmistakable" and
147. See Federal Election Conmn'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir.
1995); Federal Election Conn'n v. National Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 434-35 (D.D.C.
1989).

148. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1996).
149. Id.
150. H.R. 3526, 105th Cong. § 201(b) (1998) (proposing amendments to 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994)).

151. Id. § 201(b)(20)(A)(iii).
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"unambiguous" that they signal the means of their evasion. With the
Fourth Circuit in ChristianAction Network finding that the ad at issue in
that case could reasonably be interpreted as an anti-gay-rights ad and not
an anti-Clinton ad,' 5 2 it should be easy for political advertisers to conjure
up just enough ambiguity to avoid coverage. In any event, the openness
to interpretation of the FEC and Shays-Meehan definitions render them
susceptible to attack as unconstitutionally vague-an attack that has already
persuaded two federal courts in challenges to the FEC regulation.'53
The content of a political communication is clearly a pivotal
component in the determination of whether a message is part of an election
campaign, but content alone is not enough. The express advocacy test is
solely content based, but it is fatally underinclusive. The explosion of
election-related advertising that cleverly avoids the magic words of literal
advocacy demonstrates the inadequacy of the current express advocacy
standard. A "reasonable" viewer standard would reach election-related
communications, but such a test creates problems of vagueness and
uncertainty as well as the possibility of administrative abuse. A better
approach, focusing on the likelihood that the message would have an
impact on an election (which is, after all, the basis for regulation) would
involve going beyond the message's text to include consideration of its
timing and the amount of money spent on its production and dissemination
to the electorate.
B.

iming: Election-PeriodSpeech as Presumptively Election Related

Both the FEC regulation and the provision of the Shays-Meehan bill
would take "proximity to an election" into account in determining whether
a communication is election related." 5 This approach recognizes that for
many television watchers and radio listeners, the meaning of a political
message that features a candidate (without an express exhortation to vote
for or against that candidate) and some discussion of issues might depend
on when the ad is aired. Unfortunately, "proximity" to an election is too
hazy and uncertain a concept to be the basis of an enforceable definition.
Rather than make "proximity" a factor in the assessment of whether a
communication is part of an election campaign, the definition of election
communications should be tied to a precise time period.

152. ChristianAction Network, Inc., 110 F.3d at 1059-60.
153. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. But see Michael D. Leffel, Note, A More Sensible
Approach to Regulating Independent Expenditures: Defending the Constitutionalityof the FEC's New
Express Advocacy Standard,95 MICH. L. REV. 686, 708-710 (1995) (arguing that the FEC regulation

is not unconstitutionally vague).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
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As previously noted, elections have a distinctive timing. Discussion
of political issues may go on without resolution, but election-related
activity is focused on persuading voters to make a choice among
contending candidates on or shortly before a precise date on which they
have a political obligation to choose. Although election-related activity
precedes the actual moment of voting, the pace and sequence of electionoriented messages are focused on influencing voters' Election Day
decisions. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the timing of a message to
be a factor in the determination of whether a message is part of an election
campaign.
Communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate or group
of candidates and that are published, broadcast, or otherwise disseminated
in the period immediately before Election Day ought to be presumed to be
part of the election. First, this is the high point of the election campaign,
the period in which the voters are most likely to be considering their
Election Day decisions. Information and arguments concerning candidates
presented in the period shortly before Election Day raise the reasonable
possibility of having an impact on the election.
Second, the danger that communications referring to candidates that
are disseminated in this period will have any impact on political activity
other than the election itself is limited. Typically, in the days and weeks
immediately before Election Day, politics becomes increasingly focused on
the election. Legislative bodies whose members are up for election
generally go out of session. Executive branch officials who are up for
election devote themselves to their campaigns. In this period, political
communications that expressly refer to clearly identified candidates are
likely to have their principal impact on voters' Election Day decisions,
rather than on either general political discourse or particular government
actions.
Third, the timing of the message does affect its meaning. An electioneve message that combines references to candidates and to issues is far
more likely to affect voter thinking about the election than about political
issues generally, precisely because the message is mailed, published, or
broadcast on the eve of the election. Judge Hornby recoiled from the
FEC's reference to proximity to the election as a factor in determining
whether a communication is express advocacy, complaining that under the
FEC's approach "what is issue advocacy a year before the election may
become express advocacy on the eve of the election and the speaker must
continually re-evaluate his or her words as the election approaches."' 55
But the import and impact of a communication is likely to vary with

155. Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me.
1996), affd 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
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proximity to an election. A broadcast denunciation of President Clinton's
health care policies will mean one thing and can have one effect when
those policies are being debated by Congress more than a year before the
election, and will have another meaning and a different effect a few weeks
before Election Day when Congress is in recess and the President and
members of Congress are on the campaign trail.
Indeed, the 1998 Annenberg Center study demonstrated that issue ads
aired in the immediate pre-election period differ from issue ads broadcast
at other times of year. The study, which examined 423 ads, found that
issue ads released in the immediate pre-election period were far more likely
to refer to candidates or officeholders by name, far less likely to discuss
legislation, and far more likely to be "attack" ads than those aired in the
preceding twenty months. In 1997-1998, only 35% of the ads released
before September 1, 1998 mentioned a candidate; but 80% of the ads aired
after that date named a candidate.156 Conversely, 81 % of issue ads aired
before September 1 mentioned pending legislation, while only 22% of ads
disseminated after September 1 mentioned pending legislation." s Just
one-third of issue ads released before September 1 were attack ads, but a
little over half of the issue ads in the two months before Election Day were
attack ads.' 58
If regulation is to be based upon the timing of the message, the
legislature must define the pre-election period. The real vice in the FEC's
definition of express advocacy was not the inclusion of a reference to the
timing of the message, but its failure to prescribe precisely what constituted
temporal proximity to an election.'59 There must be a bright-line
definition that makes it clear to speakers, regulators, and courts whether
the speech falls within the pre-election period. The harder question is, of
course, what the temporal scope of the pre-election period should be. That
decision should be based on an assessment of political science data
regarding when voters focus on and make decisions concerning their
election choices, as well as on empirical data concerning the slowdown in
other political activity that occurs as political actors focus their energies
and attention on the upcoming election. Ideally, the pre-election period
would begin when the rising line of voter attention to the election crosses
the falling line of other political activity on the graph of political life.
Of course that graph does not exist, and any actual determination of
the pre-election period is necessarily arbitrary. There are currently
numerous proposals for some time-based definition of election-related

156. See Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64.

157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate and Labor Organization
Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,295 (1995) (elaborating on the definitions in 11 C.F.R. 100.22 (1996)).
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speech. One group of political scientists has proposed that corporations,
unions, trade associations, and issue groups be required to report
expenditures with respect to an identifiable federal candidate within six
months of an election."6 This, however, is far too broad a definition.
In a jurisdiction with both a primary and a general election, it could turn
more than a year in every two-year election cycle into the pre-election
period.
A Brookings Institution-American Enterprise Institute task force has
proposed that all paid communications that use a federal candidate's name
or likeness within ninety days of a primary or general election should be
considered election related and subject to regulation.1 61 The proponents
note that ninety days before an election is the same period in which
members of the House of Representatives are barred from using the
congressional frank for mass mailings to their districts. 62 This period
is also too long for regulating issue advocacy by non-incumbents. The
congressional frank-one of the many advantages an incumbent enjoysrepresents the use of public resources, and it is likely that material sent by
a member of Congress is going to be part of that member's reelection
drive. Communications by independent organizations do not involve public
resources, are not necessarily pro-incumbent, and may in fact be aimed at
affecting public opinion and legislative deliberations concerning a political
issue. A ninety-day period-reaching from early November to early
August for the general election, and from a June primary back to Marchsimply defines too much of the political year as part of the election
campaign.
A provision of the Shays-Meehan Bill would treat as express advocacy
a communication with respect to a clearly identified candidate "in a paid
advertisement that is broadcast" on television or radio within sixty days of
an election in a state in which the candidate is running. 6 Sixty days is
certainly more reasonable than ninety days, and it is consistent with the
1998 Annenberg Center data which show a sharp shift in issue advocacy
ad content from discussion of pending legislation in the period before sixty
days before Election Day to discussion of candidates in the sixty-day period
immediately before Election Day."6 But a sixty-day rule still would
convert four months of an election year into a period in which

160. See Citizens' Research Foundation, New Realities, New Thinking: Report of the Task Force
on
Campaign Finance Reform,
(May 27,
1997),
<http:lwww.usc.edu./deptICRFI
DATA/newrnewt.htm> (setting a $50,000 threshold for covered expenditures).
161. See Thomas E. Mann, Introduction, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 1-3
(Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
162. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(6)(A) (Supp. H 1996).
163. The time restriction on a senator's use of the frank is 60 days before an election in which the
senator is a candidate. See 39 U.S.C. § 3210(a)(6)(C) (1994).
164. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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communications referring to candidates are presumptively part of an
election. This would include the month of September, which will often be
a period in which Congress is seeking to resolve pending matters prior to
adjournment. 65 There is also no reason to have a special time-based
definition of express advocacy limited to broadcasting since issue advocacy
campaigns can make intensive use of mass mailings and telephone banks
as well as broadcast advertising."
My armchair analysis suggests that the period ought to be about four
weeks before a general election and two weeks before a primary. The
general election period ought to be longer because the general election
tends to dominate the rest of politics more than does a primary. The
legislature is more likely to be out of session, and elected officials are
more likely to be out on the hustings rather than involved in governance.
Public attention is also more likely to be focused on the general election,
and to focus on it earlier than on the primary. As a result, messages that
mix candidate and issue references may be more likely to affect electoral
choice rather than political views for a longer period before a general
election than before a primary.167
Four weeks seems to be about the outer limit of the pre-election period
in terms of both the attention of the voters and the diversion of political
actors from other political activity. 68 A longer period would raise a
greater danger of regulating discussion of political issues and of messages
that affect political debate generally rather than electoral choice. It is
really only in the month before a general election that other political
activity drops off sharply, that political debate is focused primarily on the
upcoming election, and that the public's interest begins to turn to the
election. Indeed, this is the period in which most issue advocacy
advertising appears to occur.
Even four weeks may be too long. In 1998, a Congress tangled up in
budget and impeachment issues remained in session deep into October and

165. Cf. West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D.W. Va. 1996)
(invalidating a West Virginia law providing that voter guides distributed within 60 days of an election
are presumed to be election related for purposes of a state law requiring reporting and disclosure of
election expenditures).
166. See BECK Er AL., supra note 2, at 14, 16, 32, 44, 45, 63 (reporting the amounts various
advocacy groups spent on different types of activities); see also DREW, supra note 10, at223 (reporting
that Americans for Tax Reform planned to use the Republican National Committee's $4.6 million gift
to mail seventeen million pieces of literature and make four million telephone calls).
167. Unfortunately, the 1998 Annenberg Center study did not compare issue ads broadcast in
September 1998 with those broadcast in October 1998 to determine if the frequency of references to
pending legislation and to candidates changed between 60 days and 30 days before the 1998
congressional elections. See Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64.
168. Cf. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Miller, 21 F. Supp.2d 740, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(enjoining enforcement of a Michigan regulation prohibiting a corporation from using a candidate's
name or likeness on a communication made within 45 days of an election-the absentee voting periodunless the corporation uses separate, segregated funds for the communication).
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did not break for the November elections until two weeks before Election
Day.169 As a result, even as the general election loomed, political debate
did not shift entirely away from pending legislative action. There is some
temptation to tie the onset of the election-eve period to the adjournment of
Congress, provided that it is thirty days or less before the election; but that
could create uncertainty and would give the incumbent Congress too much
power to manipulate the length of this period. If the party in power
believed that it would be the primary beneficiary of issue advocacy
advertising, it could avoid formal recess or adjournment altogether in order
to limit disclosure and facilitate the use of corporate or union funds in the
election. Another possibility is to define the pre-election period as thirty
days before Election Day unless Congress is still in session, in which case
the pre-election period would begin on the earlier of congressional
adjournment or two weeks before Election Day.
Like the number of petition signatures needed to place a candidate on
the ballot or, more pertinently, the number of feet from the polling place
in which a state may bar electioneering,1 70 this seems like an issue where
the courts ought to give federal and state regulators some leeway. Given
the difficulty of proving that a communication affects readers or viewers,
it would be inappropriate to require "empirical verification"171 or a
"particularized showing " " that there is some abrupt rise in the impact
of communications at five or ten or twenty days before an election. Just
as there are no magic words, there are no magic days. But it is reasonably
likely that election-eve communications that mention clearly identified
candidates are more likely to affect readers', viewers', or listeners' views
about their electoral choices than their views about political issues
unanchored to candidates. Regulating such communications is not likely
to interfere with a robust issues debate because most political debate on the
eve of the election is about the election itself rather than about issues per
se. A bright-line test is constitutionally desirable even if no particular
bright line is empirically decisive. Applying the approach taken in Burson
and Munro to legislative line-drawing in election regulation, any line thirty
days or less before the election ought to be constitutionally acceptable. 1

169. See William M. Welch, "Running-in-Place"Congress Comes to a Close, USA TODAY, Oct.
22, 1998, at A8.
170. See generally Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a Tennessee law
prohibiting campaigning within 100 feet of a polling station on Election Day); Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431 (1971) (affirming a Georgia law requiring 5% of eligible voters to sign a candidate petition
to gain ballot access if that candidate's party representative received less than 20% of the vote at the
most recent presidential or gubernatorial election).
171. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997).
172. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194 (1986).
173. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 206-11 (relaxing the burden of proof for showing that a restriction
on electioneering near a polling place is narrowly tailored to prevent voter intimidation and election
fraud); Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95, 195 (refusing to require "a State to make a particularized showing
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C. Amount of Money: Raising the Thresholdfor Regulation
Consistent with the notion that the definition of election-related activity
should focus on communications that have a reasonable likelihood of

affecting electoral outcomes, 7" only substantial expenditures referring to
candidates and occurring within the defined pre-election period should be
subject to regulation. The threshold ought to be at least one percent of the

average expenditure of the successful candidate for the office in question
over the last two or three elections, and possibly higher-up to five
percent. In 1996, the average successful candidate for the House of
Representatives spent $674,000, so that a one percent test would place the
threshold for regulation at about $6700 and a five percent test would make
the threshold $33,500.175 For the presidential general election, the figure
would be one percent of the limit on the major party candidates receiving

public funding. In 1996, the public grant was about $61.8 million, 76 so

the threshold for determining whether an expenditure concerning a
presidential candidate in the general election is election related would be

around $620,000. (Given that many expenditures might target one or a
small number of states, it might be appropriate to develop state spending
thresholds which are less than the national threshold for presidential

elections.)
These thresholds are significantly higher than FECA's current thresholds for reporting by independent committees engaged in express
advocacy, 77 and are generally higher than the thresholds used by the

states to trigger reporting requirements.178
Employing a higher monetary threshold in the definition of electionrelated expenditures could reduce the danger of subjecting general political

of the existence of voter confusion ... prior to the impositions of reasonable restrictions" because
"[s~uch a requirement would necessitate that a State's political system sustain some level of damage
before the legislature could take corrective action"). But cf. Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Stalking
the Elusive ExpressAdvocacy Standard,10 J.L. & POL. 51, 93 (1993) (calling for a five-day electioneve standard for the definition of express advocacy).
174. See supra Part IV introduction.
175. See Center for Responsive Politics, 1995-96 Big Picture: Who Paidfor the Last Election:
Campaign Statistics at a Glance, <http://www.opensecrets.org/pubslbigpicture/bpstats.htnm>.
176. See Federal Election Commission, "Financing the 1996 Presidential Campaign,"
<http://www.fec.gov/pres96/presgen.htm> (on file with The Texas Law Review).
177. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(5)(A) (1994) (requiring that express advocacy expenditures of more
than $200 to any person be reported).
178. See, e.g., Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 505 (7th
Cir. 1998) (challenging an Indiana law requiring reports of expenditures greater than $100); Vermont
Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp.2d 204, 216 (D. Vt. 1998) (upholding a Vermont
law with a $500 trigger for reporting election expenditures by giving the statute a narrow construction);
Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814, 816-18 (Va. 1998) (upholding a
Virginia law with a $100 reporting threshold).
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speech to regulation. Although most media advertisements aired or
published in the immediate pre-election period that clearly identify a
candidate for office are likely to be election related, it is conceivable that
some may address issues and concerns other than the upcoming election.
One way to mitigate the overbreadth concern is to focus regulation on
political communications that are more likely to have an effect on voter
decision-making and to exempt communications that are unlikely to have
much consequence. That can be accomplished by raising the monetary
threshold. I do not mean to argue that a specific monetary threshold is
constitutionally mandated. But with the higher monetary threshold it is
more likely that the other elements of the standard of election speechspecific reference to a candidate and either Buckley's express advocacy
test 7 1 or a precise pre-election period'°-will optimally balance the
competing constitutional concerns of vindicating the norms of election
regulation and minimizing the burden on general political speech.''
The FECA sets low reporting and disclosure thresholds." s With
major-party candidates spending above a half million dollars in contested
congressional elections,"s it is unlikely that expenditures of a thousand

179. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
180. See discussion supra Subpart rV(B).
181. It is possible that some pre-election speech that mentions a candidate's name will have
nothing to do with elections or politics. At the Symposium at which this paper was first presented,
Professor Dan Lowenstein raised the hypothetical situation of an advertisement taken out by Major
League Baseball on the occasion of the World Series honoring past baseball champions which, in a long
list of honorees, mentions Jim Bunning, just-elected Senator from Kentucky, who, at the time the ad
runs, might be a candidate for re-election. If Bunning is just one of a number of past and present
athletes mentioned in the ad, then raising the monetary threshold would make it very unlikely that the
portion of the ad costs attributable to him (and attributable to publication or broadcasting in his home
state) would cross the monetary threshold of potential electoral impact. Alternatively, the definition
of election-related speech might provide that (i) clear identification of a candidate, (ii) broadcast or
publication in the pre-election period, (iii) expenditures that cross the monetary threshold of potential
electoral impact constitute a rebuttablepresumption of election-relatedness, but that presumption could
be rebutted on a showing that based on the content and context of the speech, the viewers or readers
are unlikely to treat it as an election-related communication. That would resolve Lowenstein's Bunning
case.
182. FECA defines as a "political committee," any committee or other group of persons that
receives contributions greater than $1000 during a calendar year or makes expenditures greater than
$1000 during a calendar year. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A), (B) (1994). "Contributions" and
.expenditures" are defined as moneys used "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office." See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i) (1994). A political committee is required to identify
each person who makes a contribution greater than $200 within the calendar year. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(b)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1997). In addition, persons who make independent expenditures in
excess of $250 in a calendar year are required to report to the FEC and to identify the source of any
contribution in excess of $200 to the person making independent expenditures. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(b)(3)(A) (1994).

183. In 1996, the average candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives spent $517,000.
Preliminary figures place the average cost of a House campaign in 1998 at $512,000. See COMMrrrEE

1790

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 77:1751

dollars will have any perceptible impact on electoral outcomes. Nor is it
likely that voter decision-making would be enhanced if the sources of a few
hundred dollars are required to be disclosed. If the purpose of the
definition of election-related communication is to vindicate the underlying
concerns of campaign finance regulation-to provide voters with
information concerning the identities of those who support or oppose
particular candidates, to deter the potential for corruption, to reduce the
role of political war chests not correlated with the extent of public support
for the political positions taken-these concerns are simply not affected by
such small sums. Knowing about them provides the voters with little in the
way of useful information. These amounts are unlikely to trigger quid pro
quo obligations to the individuals or organizations who provide them. Nor
are they likely to raise the potential for undue influence on electoral
outcomes. Only larger sums of money running from one to five percent
of the average spending for the office in question present any realistic
possibility of actually affecting the election. Given current spending
patterns in congressional races, for example, the threshold for regulating
so-called issue advocacy spending in a race for the House of
Representatives ought to be in the neighborhood of at least ten thousand
dollars." s4 Consistent with the principle of justifying regulation of
election-related speech in terms of the possibility of an impact on the
election while minimizing the regulatory burden on general political
speech, the threshold for the definition of election-related speech should be
increased.
Cases like McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission"8 reflect
considerable judicial discomfort with governmental regulation of grassroots political activity. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court dwelt on the
"personally crafted" nature of Ms. McIntyre's leaflet," 8 and Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence spoke of the "individual leafleteer who, within her
local community, spoke her mind.""' 7 Not only is there less public
benefit in regulating small spenders, but there may be a greater burden on
political expression and personal autonomy if the regulation includes
individuals or grass-roots groups whose small expenditures are more likely
to reflect deeply held personal views.
Focusing regulation on communications involving larger sums of
money also enhances the prospects for compliance and enforcement. A

FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMENTS, INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS: A BUSINESS PROPOSAL FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 18 (1999).

184. Although a uniform national threshold for regulation of so-called issue advocacy in House
races could be adopted, the threshold for regulation in Senate races would need to vary according to
state population or voting age population.
185. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
186. Id. at 355.
187. Id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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higher threshold targets only the major electoral players; that is, those
participants in political spending who are best able to understand the law
and comply with its requirements. Entities that spend larger sums of
money are more capable of carefully separating their electoral from their
other political efforts and, thus, are simply less likely to stumble across the
election/politics line. Consequently, a higher threshold minimizes the
regulation of non-electoral speech. A higher threshold also enables
regulators to husband their resources and target their efforts on assuring
compliance by the major actors. This also increases the possibility of
compliance within the election campaign itself."'8
This last point is, strictly speaking, a pragmatic argument, not a
constitutional one. Yet, in the campaign finance reform area-pragmatic and
constitutional concerns may be intertwined. Campaign finance regulations
do place some burdens on political speech. These burdens are justified
only to the extent that they advance the goals of campaign finance
regulation. A definition of election speech that is difficult for campaign
participants to comply with, or for regulators to enforce, raises the
unwelcome prospect of burdens without benefits and ultimately mocks the
constitutional values underlying campaign finance regulation. A more
enforceable definition is more constitutionally permissible because the
restrictions on political communications resulting from regulation are
justified by more effective attainment of the norms underlying the
restrictions.
As with the definition of the pre-election period, there is no magic to
a one percent threshold and no clear justification for one percent as
opposed to any other limit. As with the other questions of election law
line-drawing, these ought to be "matters of degree" for which political
decision-makers enjoy some discretion. The critical point is that a
definition more carefully focused on larger expenditures, determined
relative to the actual levels of spending by candidates, does a better job of
achieving the goals of campaign finance regulation and is more respectful
of First Amendment interests.
D. Specific Rules
The proposed definition of election-related communications is intended
to balance the protection of general political speech from government
regulation against the interest in effective enforcement of campaign finance
laws that are consistent with, indeed, supportive of, the basic role of
elections in creating a structure of democratic self-governance. The

188. On the difficulties of enforcing disclosure requirements and the importance of factoring
enforcement concerns into the substance of regulation, see MALBIN & GAIS, supra note 77, at 33-50.
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definition expands Buckley's coverage of election-related speech beyond the
easily evaded express advocacy standard to include clear references to a
candidate during the election campaign that involve the expenditure of a
threshold sum of money, but it uses a relatively short pre-election period
and a high expenditure threshold to protect individuals, groups, and grassroots organizations engaged in true issue advocacy from the toils of the
election laws. For some identifiable groups or activities, however, the
balance of interests may tip in favor of a different definition of electionrelated communication. The two special cases that come to mind are issue
advocacy by major political parties and voter guides issued by advocacy
groups.
1. Issue Advocacy by the Major Political Parties.-The Annenberg
Center found that the major parties accounted for more than half the issue
advocacy expenditures in the 1996 election and for more than 70% of issue
advocacy expenditures in the two months preceding Election Day
1998.189 Major political party advocacy presents a much stronger case
for regulation," 9 while raising fewer of the concerns that would demand
a narrower definition of election-related activities. Unlike many ideological
advocacy groups, the major political parties receive corporate and union
funds in their soft money accounts. 9 ' Indeed, major party "issue
advocacy" provides an important conduit for corporate and union
participation in elections. Moreover, the two major parties are powerful
organizations in their own right.
Between them they control the
overwhelming majority of federal and state offices. Unlike the case for
small, independent, or grass-roots organizations, the reporting and
disclosure of contributions to and expenditures by the parties is unlikely to
have a chilling effect on the parties, their supporters, or the vendors from
whom they buy services. In addition, as skilled campaign professionals,
the major political parties are in the best position to conform their activities
to legal requirements.
As they are already subject to considerable
regulation, requiring the parties to report on more of their candidate-related
campaign activities would not create a significant new administrative
burden. Most importantly, the raison d'etre of the two major political

189. See BECK Er AL., supra note 2, at 3, 34, 55; Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64.
190. Political party issue ads were also particularly likely to consist of attacks on a candidate. The
1998 Annenberg study found that 23.9% of ads aired by candidates in the last two months of an
election were attack ads, and that 32.0% of the ads aired by non-party issue organizations in that period
were attack ads, but that 59.5% of party issue ads in the pre-election period were attack ads. See
Stanger & Rivlin, supra note 64, at 8.
191. See Center for Responsive Politics, Who Paidfor This Election? Top Soft Money Donors,
1997-98 (visited May 26, 1999) <http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/whopaid/softltopdonors.htm>
(reporting that most donors of soft money in amounts in excess of $300,000 were either corporations
or unions).
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concerning issues primarily to advance the prospects of their candidates for
winning elective office. Given the electoral focus of the major parties,
party communications concerning issues will typically be election related.
The First Amendment should tolerate a much broader definition of
election speech when it comes to the activities of the major political
parties. The pre-election period could be expanded, and the monetary
threshold lowered, to encompass more party expenditures that mention
candidates. Indeed, given the close connections between parties and their
candidates, I think that all party advertising that refers to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office ought to be treated as election-related
activity. As a practical matter, however, some monetary threshold would
be desirable to focus enforcement efforts on more substantial activities;
similarly, the determination of whether a person referred to in an
advertisement is a candidate for federal office is likely to have a significant

temporal element.
Such an approach is not precluded by Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission.93 That decision
held that a party's spending in support of a candidate may be considered
"independent spending" and is not necessarily subject to FECAs
restrictions on spending that is "coordinated with a candidate. " 194
Colorado Republican, however, did not consider whether party
expenditures concerning clearly identified candidates that refrain from
literal advocacy ought to be treated as election related or, rather, ought to
be exempt from election regulation."9 Party independent spending, like

192. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES INAMERICA 12, 12-13 (1995) (elaborating on the view, most rigorously advocated
by Anthony Downs and Joseph A. Schlesinger, that the "competition for office" is "the singular,
defining characteristic of the major American political party").
193. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
194. See id. at 619 (holding that the lower court's "conclusive presumption that all party
expenditures are 'coordinated'" was an error as a matter of law).
195. ColoradoRepublican involved advertising by the Colorado Republican Party which criticized
the record of the likely Democratic nominee for Colorado's U.S. Senate seat, but did not expressly call
for the Democrat's defeat. The District Court determined that the ad "[a]t best... contains an indirect
plea for action" which fell short of express advocacy. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (D. Colo. 1993). The Tenth Circuit
agreed that the ad would not constitute express advocacy "within the narrow definition of Buckley and
[Massachusetts CitizensforLife]," but found that it contained an "electioneering message" within the
meaning of an FEC advisory opinion determining that such messages by political parties were subject
to FECA's limitations on party coordinated spending. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1023 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court found
that the Republican Party's spending was independent of the campaign of any Republican candidate and,
thus, was not subject to FECA's dollar limitations on party coordinated spending. Colorado
Republican, 518 U.S. at 613. The Court did not address whether the party ad was exempt from
regulations altogether as issue advocacy.
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other forms of independent spending, is subject to FECbs reporting and
disclosure requirements and contribution limitations and prohibitions; these
are the very regulations that would be avoided if a communication is
defined as issue advocacy.'96 Colorado Republican establishes that a
major party can support its candidates in a manner independent of the
candidate's campaign, but that is in no way inconsistent with a
determination that a party's expenditures concerning a clearly identified
candidate are part of the election that the candidate is contesting.
Certainly, party communications that are actually coordinated with a
candidate ought to be treated as election-related speech subject to regulation
even if the party ads avoid express advocacy of the election or defeat of
particular candidates."9 Such coordination is likely to be difficult to
prove during the heat of a campaign.198 More importantly, formal
coordination should not be required in order to find that major-party
spending that explicitly refers to a candidate is express advocacy. The
institutional commitment of parties to the election of candidates, and the
lack of danger that expanded regulation would interfere with
communications solely concerning issues, support a broader definition that
treats party advertising concerning clearly identified candidates as electionrelated speech, subject to disclosure requirements and limits on the size and
sources of contributions. Disclosure is unlikely to chill contributions to the
major parties. Indeed, the greater public interest in information concerning
the financial support for the two major parties which dominate our political
system, together with the increased reliance of the major parties on funding
from sources that are specially restricted, militates in favor of a broader
definition for election-related speech for major-party spending.
2. Voter Guides.-One of the most frequent causes of legal conflict
under the existing express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction is the
treatment of "voter guides," that is, compilations of how a candidate has

196. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994).
197. According to the FEC staff, this was the case with the Republican National Committee
advertisements for the Dole campaign in 1996 and the Democratic National Committee advertisements
for Clinton-Gore in 1995-96. See DOLE REPORT, supra note 81, at 79; CLINTON-GORE REPORT, supra
note 78, at 16-20.
198. The FEC staff findings concerning the 1996 major party presidential candidates followed
extensive "reviews of bank records, media flight reconciliations for time buys, affidavits and invoices
issued by broadcast stations, internal documents prepared by the [candidate committee] relating to the
planning and purchase of TV air time, production invoices and related documents, most of which were
obtained as a result of subpoenas issued by the [FEC]." CLINTON-GORE REPORT, supra note 78, at
20. The audit took nearly two years to complete. For an analysis of the difficulties of proving
coordinated activity between a party or political committee and a candidate, see Darrell M. West,
Checkbook Democracy: How Money Hijacked American Campaigns (presented at the Brown
University Conference on Democratic Equality, Apr. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with

author).

1999]

Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line

1795

voted, or the positions a candidate has taken, with respect to issues of
interest to the organization publishing the guide.1
These guides also
frequently include some characterization of how a candidate's votes or
issue positions match up against the organization's own positions. Voter
guides present a particularly thorny problem because they are the rare form
of issue advocacy that actually provides information concerning issues, yet
they can, and are surely intended to, affect how people will vote in an
election. The FEC has tried to regulate corporate and labor organization
voter guides that are distributed to the general public. The FEC standard
turns in part on the presence or absence of "an electioneering message" or
whether the guide "score[s] or rate[s] the candidates' responses in such a
way as to convey an electioneering message." 2' The Shays-Meehan Bill
would exempt voter guides and voting record information from the
definition of express advocacy only insofar as such information is presented
"in an educational manner." 1 Both the FEC regulation and ShaysMeehan would also condition the exemption of voter guides on the absence
of coordination between the entity issuing the voter guide and any
candidate or party.'
Classifying voter guides according to the content of their messagesmuch like the attempt to develop an entirely content-based measure of issue
advocacy generally-is unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Concepts
like "electioneering" or "educational manner" are inherently vague and
create uncertainties for both the publishers of voting guides and
enforcement agencies. Would a voter guide that combines a statement of
a candidate's votes or positions on certain issues with a statement of the
sponsoring organization's positions on the same issues be engaged in
electioneering or depart from presentation in an educational manner? What

199. See, e.g., Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing a suit brought to enjoin the application of the state registration requirement to organizations
that publish voter guides, noting that the state policy of not applying registration requirements to issue
advocacy groups rendered the suit nonjusticiable); Clifton v. Federal Election Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1309,
1311 (1st Cir. 1997) (claiming that FEC regulation of voter guides is "'invalid as not authorized' by
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998); Faucher v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 471 (1st Cir. 1991) (addressing whether a regulation of voter guides
is inconsistent with specific sections of FECA); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F.
Supp.2d 204 (D. Vt. 1998) (upholding disclosure and reporting requirements that would foree the Right
to Life Committee to place disclaimers on its voting guides and other publications); North Carolina
Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 3 F. Supp.2d 675, 677 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aft'd, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS
2350 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1999) (noting that North Carolina laws restricting publication of voter guides
violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights); West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp.
1036, 1037 (S.D.W. Va. 1996) (contending that West Virginia's voter guide law was overbroad
because it regulated issue advocacy).
200. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(5)(ii)(D)-(E) (1998).
201. Campaign Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3526, 105th Cong. (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(20)(B)(i) (1998)).
202. See id. § 201(b)(20)(B)(ii); 11 C.F.R. § 14.4(c)(5)(ii)(A) (1999).
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about a guide that underscores the names of candidates who generally
support the organization's positions or the name of the candidate in each
pair of opposing candidates whose positions come closer to those of the
issuing organization? Surely such information can be both educational and
electioneering, in the sense of a communication intended to influence
voting decisions.
Rather than attempt to distinguish educational from electioneering, I
would draw a different line. I would distinguish between voting record
information distributed internally-to an organization's officers, members,
affiliates, or the regular recipients of publications and other mailings of the
organization-and externally, that is, to the general public.
Communications within an organization concerning the organization's
positions on political issues implicate the core of freedom of association.
The officers, members, and other persons who have voluntarily chosen to
affiliate with an organization have a distinct interest-different from and
greater than that of the general public-in learning the organization's views
concerning candidates. Conversely, there is little benefit in terms of the
goals of campaign regulation in treating such communications as regulated
speech. There is only a limited informational gain from applying
disclosure requirements to the expenditure of funds for internal
dissemination of voter guides since officers, members, and regular
recipients of organization publications presumably already know quite a bit
about the organization and its views on issues. Nor does communication
among persons who have a common affiliation raise the same concern
about the projection of an organization's war chest into the electoral arena,
which is the principal rationale supporting restrictions on corporate and
union electoral activity. Indeed, FECAs restrictions on corporations and
unions do not apply to such internal communications. 2 3 Similarly, if the
internal communication of a voter guide is not coordinated with a
candidate, it could not be treated as a contribution, and regulation could
not be justified in terms of the goals that support contribution limitations.
The distribution of a voter guide to the general public is a different
story.'
The associational interest is diminished and the danger of the

203. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A) (1994).
204. Compare United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (reversing the dismissal of an

indictment brought against a labor union, under FECA's predecessor statute, for paying for television
broadcasts aimed at the general electorate that endorsed candidates), with United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948) (affirming dismissal of indictment against a labor union brought under FECA's
predecessor statute for spending money to distribute to union members a union newspaper containing
union endorsements of political candidates). Professor C. Edwin Baker drew a similar distinction in
an earlier article. See C. Edwin Baker, CampaignExpenditures andFreeSpeech, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1998) (distinguishing between activities of "politically engaged advocacy
organizations" when "they employ their established media or other regular communication methods"
and such "groups' special attempts to spread an electoral message beyond their membership or usual
audience").
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projection of economic power into the political arena is strengthened where
there is no preexisting connection between the organization and the persons
who receive the message. Given the lack of such a connection between
sponsor and audience, and the increasingly cryptic names of many of the
organizations participating in election campaigns, disclosure of the source
of funds for the organization distributing a voter guide can be critical to the
voter's appraisal of the information provided. Moreover, so long as the
organization disseminating the voter guide operates at arm's length from
the candidate, its activities would be treated as independent expenditures
and not as contributions. Thus, spending limits would not apply, 0 5 and
the only burden on a sponsor who crossed the monetary threshold would
be reporting and disclosure.
E.

The Definition of Election-RelatedSpeech and the Scope of Campaign
FinanceRegulation

I noted at the outset of this article that the definition of election-related
speech and the scope of campaign regulation are separate questions.
Certainly, the determination of what forms of campaign finance regulation
are constitutionally permissible does not determine what kinds of activities
fall into the category of campaign activities. Yet, although the two
questions are logically distinct, in practice they may be connected.
It is easier to justify an expansion of the category of election-related
speech when the consequences are minimally burdensome: reporting and
disclosure by organizations spending relatively large sums of money;
limiting large individual donations; requiring corporations and unions to
finance these communications from their PACs rather than from treasury
funds;' and forcing parties to reclassify certain activities as independent
expenditures rather than issue advocacy, with attendant disclosure
requirements and contribution restrictions, but no expenditure
Not only would the proposed redefinition of electionlimitations.'
related speech address some of the blatant evasions which currently make
a mockery of the entire campaign finance enterprise, but the principal
consequences-increased information and more effective enforcement of
constitutionally valid contribution restrictions, as well as limitations on

205. Of course, if the organization publishing the voter guide is a business corporation or a labor
union, then FECA's restrictions, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994), would apply to the use of treasury funds (but
not PAC funds) for its production and dissemination.
206. Under Supreme Court precedent many ideological groups that take the corporate form, such
as right-to-life organizations, are exempt from this requirement. See Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986).
207. In his comment, RegulatingElection Speech Under the FirstAmendment, 77 TEXAS L. REV.
1837 (1999), Professor Robert Post suggests that an expansion of the definition of election-related
speech would be easiest to justify for the least burdensome of existing campaign finance laws-the
reporting and disclosure requirements.
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corporate and union campaign activities-are consistent with the broader
values of the First Amendment.
If the Constitution were amended or interpreted to permit greater
regulation of election-related speech, particularly if it permitted the
imposition of expenditure limits on candidates and independent spending,
the definition of election-related speech would become more difficult. An
expansion of the goals and techniques of campaign finance regulation
would surely reflect a reconsideration of the place of equality of
participation in the definition of a fair and democratic process. If the
Constitution were held to permit regulation that equalizes the opportunity
to influence election outcomes by limiting candidate, party, and, especially,
independent committee spending, the determination of what is considered
to be election-related spending would become even more important than it
is currently.
The impact of simultaneously expanding both the definition of an
election and the permissible regulation of election-related communications
would have greater implications for political speech than either step taken
alone. Conceivably, a broader definition of election-related speech might
discourage the Court from supporting expanded campaign finance
regulation; alternatively, the possibility of spending limits might lead courts
to be wary of expanding the definition of what constitutes campaign
spending.
At this point, a judicial redefinition of the goals and techniques of
campaign finance in the direction of greater equalization would be a
dramatic step, entailing a repudiation of most of the last quarter-century's
campaign finance jurisprudence. Judicial reconsideration of the placement
of the election/politics line in light of existing campaign practices would
constitute a significant change in the express advocacy doctrine, but it
would be a much more modest and nuanced action than a validation of
spending limits, and it would be entirely consistent with continued
adherence to the principal elements of Buckley. Indeed, given the
emergence of major election-spending campaigns that take the form of issue
advocacy, some redrawing of the election/politics line is both necessary and
appropriate, not to increase the regulation of campaign finances or to
change the campaign finance system, but to vindicate the regulatory norms
the Supreme Court upheld in Buckley and to restore FECA as it stood
following the Buckley decision.
V.

Conclusion

Some distinction between election-related spending and other political
spending is essential for any campaign finance regime, whether a minimal
regulatory regime focused purely on disclosure or more ambitious efforts
to limit contributions or expenditures. The current limited definition of
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express advocacy fails to correspond to the actual demarcation between an
election campaign and the rest of politics. Instead, it has become an open
invitation to evasion of campaign finance regulation. A better definition
of election-related speech would incorporate both the legitimate
governmental interest in designing a fair and legitimate process for
collective selection of a democratic government and the First Amendment
interest in protecting non-election-related speech. It would provide a clear
line, although the actual location of that line would necessarily reflect
political judgments about the relative importance of a number of conflicting
values rather than an extrapolation from incontestable principles. Such a
line ought to look to the timing of the communication and the amount of
money spent on it, as well as to the express words of the message. The
identity of the speaker-whether or not it is a major political party-and the
nature of the communication (whether it is an internal communication from
an organization to its members) are relevant as well. The resulting
definition would be both more effective in practice and more accurate in
theory in mapping the elusive but essential election/politics line.
I should address, briefly, three of the many criticisms that I anticipate
will be leveled at this proposal. These correspond to the types of
arguments that Albert 0. Hirschman flagged in The Rhetoric of Reaction:
Futility, Perversity, Jeopardy."8 First, it may be that this approach, like
so many campaign finance reforms, will prove futile. In the twenty-five
years since Watergate sparked the amendments to FECA that produced our
current regulatory regime, politicians and organizations seeking to
influence electoral politics have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to
frustrate legislative efforts to restrict the flow of campaign dollars. The
rise of such institutions as independent committees, bundling, soft money,
and issue advocacy demonstrates the capacity of electoral actors to frustrate
reform.
One argument, then, is that a redefinition of election-related spending,
whatever its appeal in theory, is, like other forms of campaign finance
reform, doomed to failure. Certainly, a quarter-century of campaign
finance reform has done little to constrain the role of money in politics.
Yet, the futility thesis fails to acknowledge that some reforms-public
funding, individual contribution limits-have had consequences. The very
need for politicians and political organizations to invent new campaign
finance techniques is a back-handed testimonial to the effectiveness of some
rules in curtailing or eliminating some practices.
Moreover, some
reforms-such as public funding of congressional elections-were never
attempted, while others were hamstrung from the outset by judicial

208. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY
(1991).
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interpretation. Central components of the current campaign finance
regime-such as the narrow express advocacy definition of election-related
spending-have operated to curtail the effectiveness of regulation. It will
not be clear if the redefinition of election-related speech is futile unless it
is tried.
The argument for the futility of reform may really be an argument
about its perversity. Campaign finance reform has repeatedly demonstrated
the law of unanticipated consequences. Restrictions on individual donations
to candidates contributed directly to the rise of PACs and to the emergence
of bundling, much as the limits incident to the public funding of
presidential candidates stimulated the rise of independent committees, soft
money, and issue advocacy. Campaign reform rules in some sense work
in that they limit the activities they directly address, but they may also lead
to new practices that not only permit the circumvention of the rules but
increase the role of special interest groups, political intermediaries, and
other financial power brokers to the detriment of our democratic system.
Again, this may very well be a valid criticism, providing a useful
caution about the need to think through the possible consequences of
reform. How will those now engaged in issue advocacy react if they are
subject to regulation? Certainly, they are likely to engage in more issue
spending earlier in the political cycle-probably in the weeks immediately
before any statutory pre-election period and possibly even earlier than
that.'
Expanding the definition of regulated election-related speech may
also lead to a shift in spending from elections to political advocacy outside
the electoral context-what might be called "actual issue advocacy," in
contrast to the so-called issue advocacy that is really election-related
speech. We could see more ads like the "Harry and Louise" campaign
deployed by the health insurance industry to stir grass-roots opposition to
the Clinton health plan in 1993 and 1994.21°
Would the costs of these developments offset, if not outweigh, the
gains from expanding the definition of election-related speech? Displacing
issue advocacy to the earlier weeks of the campaign does raise the danger
that issue ads could set the tone of the campaign before it even gets

209. It is not certain whether my approach to the definition of election-related speech would have
had an impact on the multi-million dollar issue advocacy campaign undertaken by the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) in support of the Clinton-Gore ticket in the 1995-96 election cycle. Much
of the DNC spending occurred in 1995, or well before the onset of the formal pre-election period.
However, as I suggest a broader definition of election-related speech when it comes to the activities of
the major political parties, the election time period may be less of a problem than the determination of
whether the President was already a candidate for re-election in 1995. To the extent that the party
spending was coordinated with representatives of the Clinton-Gore campaign, it could also be covered
by rules concerning major-party coordinated expenditures. See supra text accompanying notes 193-99.
210. See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSrEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
PoLmcs AT THE BREAKING POINT 205-13 (1996).
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underway. Of course, nothing now prevents parties and special interest
organizations from focusing their advocacy on the opening phases of an
electoral cycle if it is in their self-interest. If the proposed definition of
election-related speech would force parties and committees to air their ads
earlier than they would if not subject to regulation, then regulation could
make issue advocacy less effective. More issue advocacy in the earlier
weeks of a campaign may reduce the benefits of subjecting such advocacy
to regulation in later weeks, but the result would still be an overall gain in
terms of advancing the goals of election regulation. Certainly, it would be
more feasible for candidates targeted by issue ads to attempt a rejoinder.
The news media would have more time to explore the content of the
allegations in, and the sources of the funds behind, issue ads if the ads
were to appear earlier in a campaign rather than in the final weeks.
Increasing the information available to the voters concerning campaign
finances could increase the quality of electoral decision-making.
As for the possibility that the regulation of so-called issue ads might
stimulate greater actual issue advocacy, with political groups devoting more
resources to mass media campaigns aimed at affecting legislative
deliberations rather than election outcomes, it is hard to tell if society
would be worse off. Again, there is currently no constraint on such
activity, and, as the Harry and Louise ads suggest, true issue advocacy
may be growing even though so-called issue advocacy focused on electoral
campaigns is unrestrained. Moreover, such campaigns may be less harmful
to democratic decision-making than campaigns targeted at elections. Actual
issue campaigns would be aimed at affecting the climate of public opinion
in which public officials act, but not at the selection of public officials and
the make-up of the government. The effects of these campaigns may be
more limited and uncertain. They may affect public opinion without
affecting public officials, and even if they affect public action on some
issues, there will be many other public issues that have not been targeted
by issue campaigns. Still, some recognition of the hydraulic nature of
political money, and some acknowledgment of the fact that private wealth
blocked from so-called issue advocacy is likely to show up somewhere else
in the political process is necessary to temper expectations concerning the
practical benefits of expanding the definition of election-related speech to
encompass so-called issue advocacy.
Finally, the third criticism of the regulation of issue advocacy is that
such regulation would undermine the value of political competition. The
argument for the constitutionality of a broader definition of election-related
activity relies in part on the Supreme Court's election law decisions,
particularly the ballot access cases. These cases have been criticized for
their valorization of the two-party system, their willingness to allow the
major parties to insulate themselves from challenges from third parties and
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independents, and their failure to subject restrictions on voters' choices and
political associations to the strict judicial scrutiny appropriate when
fundamental rights are at stake. Certainly, the Court's assertion of the
virtues of the two-party system in justifying limits on minor parties and
independents raises important concerns about the ability of incumbents to
use election regulations to fortify themselves against challengers. Viewing
the issue advocacy problem through the prism of the ballot access cases
thus arguably entrenches these cases and the protections they provide the
political status quo in constitutional law, and may be said to jeopardize the
value of open and unfettered political competition.
The ballot access cases do raise questions about the degree of
appropriate judicial deference to rules about the electoral process that have
been adopted by incumbents. Still, it is far from clear that extending the
approach of the ballot access cases, particularly the assumption that election
regulation involves the balancing of individual rights and the collective
concern in organizing the electoral process, would be harmful. The ballot
access cases seem pretty well entrenched already. Indeed, over time, the
Court appears to have become increasingly deferential to state policies in
this area. These cases may be mistaken, but it is not clear that applying
their reasoning to campaign finance regulation does any new harm. As
long as these cases are established constitutional law, we might want to see
how they can be useful in analyzing the issues posed by governmental
regulation of campaign spending.
More importantly, the ballot access cases do get at something
significant about elections. These cases usefully underscore the role of the
election as a mechanism for collective choice, and the need to review state
regulations of the electoral process not only from the perspective of
individual rights, but in terms of their impact on the role of the election in
producing a government. The particular lines the Court has drawn may
reflect an undue suspicion of third parties and independents, an
unwarranted hostility to write-in ballots, and an excessive deference to
political incumbents' tributes to the two-party system. But the basic idea
that elections must be regulated if they are to perform their function of
providing a mechanism for collective decision-making, and that election
regulation involves the reconciliation of conflicting individual and collective
concerns, is not only right but an appropriate basis for thinking about the
regulation of election-related spending.

